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11. World Cultural Heritage: A Critique
In contemporary perception vestiges of the past are like endangered 
species: the ones still surviving have to be protected to avoid their possible 
disappearance. Hence, similar to animals under threat of extinction, relics 
are kept in enclosed areas that safeguard and allow their display while lists 
of crum bling m onum ents are draw n up to establish a N oah's Ark of 
cultural remnants. Removed from daily vicissitudes, heritage becomes an 
essential element of "extra-ordinary" life, holiday time, when visiting a 
m useum  or an exhibition is a more likely event. Yet, just as captivity 
changes animal behaviour, the survival of heritage in "cultural zoos" alters 
its character and value. Furthermore, memory, which allows people to 
relive their history, never has an idealistic nature. It always is a function of 
present and particular perspectives, at the personal as well as at the 
collective level. N evertheless, conservation of ru ins is now adays 
implemented with global aims under the formula of World Heritage, a list 
of natural and cultural sites to maintain for future generations. World 
Heritage has UNESCO as its great sponsor and national governments as its 
m ain executor. It is thus clear that, despite the stress on antiquity from 
which relics emerge and the posterity for which they are preserved, the 
establishment and consumption of a world cultural heritage is a social and 
cultural phenomenon which matters essentially in the present.
21.1 The Meanings of Cultural Heritage
According to the 1972 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
W orld's Cultural and Natural Heritage, "cultural heritage" is defined as the 
complex of monuments, buildings and archaeological sites "of outstanding 
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science" (Hewinson 
1989:15). More recent definitions label as heritage not only physical objects 
(immovable as well as movable, like crafts, m anuscripts and scientific 
collections) but non-physical features too, such as oral traditions, rites, 
performing arts, in sum everything generally named as folklore, or culture 
in the broadest sense. Of course, the more extensive the definition of 
heritage, the more problematic becomes the enforcement of an effective 
conservation policy, especially with regard to the financial constraints of 
developing countries. In any case, wide concern for heritage preservation 
can be considered quite a recent trend, which notew orthily developed 
during the last two or three decades, at the time of the massive expansion of 
international tourism.
It is indeed evident that attention to heritage is often accorded 
precedence when it coincides with, or prom otes, economic gain from 
tourism. This consideration is reflected in the definition of heritage as a 
"cultural resource" or "cultural property," whose characteristic is to be "a 
unique and non-renewable resource" (Don Fowler, quoted in Pisit 1988:1). 
Hence, heritage preservation is not only essential for avoiding the waste of 
outstanding examples of hum an creativity, but because the waste of such 
attractions would badly affect the capacity of a country to become, or 
continue to be, a tourist destination. In turn, profits from a flourishing
tourism  industry can contribute to a better conservation of the country's 
artistic patrimony.
Because of this, criticism tends to focus on those heritage policies 
which appear to be specifically designed to suit the interests of the tourism 
industry, and hence somehow in contrast with the aims of conservation. 
However, the point at stake in this chapter is one of priority, that is, cultural 
heritage as a source of meanings. It is nowadays a commonly accepted 
notion that heritage is a basic element in the definition of cultural identity 
(cf. Shennan 1989). Read, for example, the following two statements:
The cultural heritage expresses each people's historical experience and its collective 
personality. It is an integral part of cultural identity within the consciousness of 
individuals and of the community (Makangiasar 1986:12); Through the realisation of 
their cultural heritage, people become aware of and proud of their own contribution to 
the history of mankind and simultaneously they find concrete evidence of their cultural 
identity (Yamamoto 1986:21).
These statements subtend two main assumptions. First, heritage is 
valued not so much for its intrinsic w orth but as a mode of signification, a 
sign, in which the past is the signifier (what it is showed"), and the present 
the signified (what it is purported). Since any single specimen of heritage 
refers, in various respects, to that shared patrim ony of historic territory, 
common myths, historical memoirs and mass culture which identifies a 
nation (Smith 1991:14), heritage connotes nationhood. (In this regard, the 
arrow of an Amazonian tribe and the Cheops pyramid can be seen as equally 
meaningful manifestations of the respective cultures which created them.) 
As such, heritage becomes a basic ingredient of national identity, along with 
language, religion, flag, geographic borders, customs, food, etc. And if all 
these elements have to be considered as cultural heritage according to its 
more extensive definition, then it is clear that heritage ends by representing 
national identity tout court.
4The second assumption is that the meaning of heritage is at the same
time unifying and differentiating. On the one hand, the unifying function
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on the national level is dubbed on the universal one, since heritage pajFallefs-
and  assimilates every culture, by means of the contribution of its own 
originality  and "outstanding universal value," in the great tem ple of 
hum an creativity. On the other hand, heritage identifies nations by 
distinguishing and typologising their specific cultural production. In sum  
heritage is, above all, a discourse about culture as identity, which tells people 
who they are by making visible, through arts and crafts, their past. This 
discourse is assertive because the statements it makes about the past claim 
authenticity  resulting from the authority  of scholarship (archaeology, 
epigraphy, etc.). Incidentally, there is no artistic "aura" w ithout the 
au thenticating  function of scholarship, w hich establishes the objects 
deserving public admiration. The concept of aura explains why the large 
availability of visual and audio reproductions do not stop masses of people 
from traveling to see or listen to the original item, whether a painting or a 
m onum ent or a performance.1
Authenticity is thus what is apparently required by cultural artefacts 
and activities in order to be meaningful within the local context as well as in 
the appreciation of outside observers. In fact, heritage maintains unaltered 
its prerogatives even when it merely displays a "staged authenticity," to 
borrow  the keen term  introduced by M acCannel (1973). The term
1I therefore disagree with Urry's (1990:84-86) thesis of the "anti-auratic" character of post­
m odern culture (a denial of the separation of the aesthetic from the social and of art from 
ordinary life), which would make cultural forms consumed not in a state of contemplation but 
of distraction. However Urry hits the target when he writes that the gaze within the 
museum, once premised upon the aura of the historical artefact, has changed substantially 
and mainly as a response to the pressure of consumerism (cf. further, note 9). The concept of 
aura is from Walter Benjamin's well-known essay "The work of art in the age of mechanical 
reproduction," first published in 1936.
5"authenticity" itself can be problematised when used with regard to cultural 
heritage. Let us see why.
1.2 Simulacra of the Past
At first glance heritage appears to be w hat has survived the wreckage 
of the past, the passing of time itself seen as operating as a kind of natural 
selection. This superficial im pression is m oreover consistent with the 
etymology, since heritage means w hat we inherit from our ancestors. In 
spite of this we should recognise that heritage is, in many cases, not so much 
w hat fortuitously survives but, rather, what is consciously selected in order 
to survive. Survival is ensured by national, and lately international, 
cultural policies which choose w hat deserves to be safeguarded for future 
generations and what does not; w hat should be shown in museum displays; 
which events or historical personages have to be commemorated through 
the erection of m onum ents and memorial buildings.2
Once they have been selected to survive, cultural rem nants are 
constantly transform ed (and hence, somehow up-dated) both directly, by 
protection, restoration, or iconoclasm; and indirectly, by replicas, emulations 
and fakes (Lowenthal 1985: Chap. 6). Transformed into objects of the present 
that speak about the past, relics become one source of historical knowledge. 
Yet the s ta n d a rd  of  veracity of such "commodified" or "artefactual" history 
is questionable, especially w ith regard to the commercially successful
2Thus Wallerstein (1991:98): Since the state has become the major mechanism of allocating 
social income, the states are pressed to offer financial support to both the sciences and the 
arts, in all their multiple forms. And since the money available is inherently limited, the 
state must make choices in both the sciences and the arts. Clearly, in any given state, after 
100 years of making such decisions, it is very clear that a 'national' culture will exist even if 
it didn t exist at the outset. A particular past, a heritage, is institutionalized."
6historical reenactments in heritage locations, because sanitised and artificial 
interpretations of the past without the marks of violence, exploitation, and
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disease, tend to prevail in order not to strike the audience and spoil the 
recreational character of the visit (Uzzell 1989). In any case, heritage 
in te rp re ta tion  necessarily  im plies a stra tegy, e ither educational or 
recreational; and in the thinking of many cultural resources m anagers it is 
only the coupling of the two strategies that can give heritage a more 
significant value.
Given the strong evocative character of ruins, it is also clearly 
understandable that political leaderships have always been interested in 
exploiting archaeological remains as a way to gain "the generation, control, 
and allocation of one symbolic resource, the Past" (Fowler 1987:230). 
M aterial accom plishm ents of historic societies recovered w ith in  the 
boundaries of contem porary nation-states are comm only enlisted as 
"national" heritage. And instances of the utilisation of archaeology to 
sustain nationalistically biased interpretations of the past are countless. 
Trigger (1984:356) has suggested the categorisation of nationalist, colonialist 
and imperialist archaeologies, arguing that "the nature of archaeological 
research is shaped to a significant degree by the roles that particular nation­
states play, economically, politically, and culturally, as interdependent parts 
of the m odern world-system."3
Fowler (1987) offers some examples both in the sense of archaeology 
used for affirming a genealogical or a cultural continuity with the past, and 
hence the connection with the ultimate sources of power which legitimise
3However the author still believes in the archaeologist's search for objectivity, since "the 
findings of archaeology can only have lasting social value if they approximate as closely as 
possible to an objective understanding of human behaviour” (Trigger 1984:368).
7the exercise of rule, and even the right to impose this rule all over the 
world; and, on the contrary, in the sense of affirming a discontinuity with a 
past which is not given any legitimising authority over the present.4 In 
post-colonial states the sweeping away of the foreign past has opened the 
way to the recovery (that often means the creation) of a "national" cultural 
identity and the "true" heritage dissipated during the colonial rule; and in 
order to dispute the charges of backwardness and immobility, archaeology 
has been called to provide proofs of self-developm ent and autonom ous 
local change. Thus, while cultural heritage has been recognised as a basic 
element of cultural identity, another fundam ental point has been clearly 
spelled out:
The idea of protecting the archaeological heritage is intimately linked with various 
political ideologies, whether nationalist, colonialist or im perialist [but] since the 
archaeologists are themselves members of society, such ideologies have been concealed 
and represented as natural (Kristiansen 1989:24).
The awareness of these important implications in the uses of heritage 
has recently generated a debate among archaeologists about the ethical 
principles which should preside over the management of cultural resources 
(see Cleere 1989; Layton 1989a, 1989b; Gathercole-Lowenthal 19905). Central 
questions are those of the criteria to apply to heritage preservation (e.g., 
selective versus comprehensive; restoration versus plain conservation); 
that of an appropriate legislation defining such criteria, which in any case 
will reflect socio-economical, ideological, and academic constraints. The
4The PRC, the case discussed by Fowler (1987:239), is one in which the national past is 
interpreted according to state ideology: "PRC purpose is to glorify and hence justify the 
present and the future by denigrating the evil past. . . . Qin terracotta army and the other 
great treasures from the past have become visible symbols of the strength and genius of the 
People throughout three millennia of oppression that ended in 1949." However, it should be 
observed that every time a discontinuity with the past occurs, the national history (or part of 
it) and its cultural production are at least reinterpreted (and often denied), and not 
necessarily from a Marxist perspective.
5 All these books belong to a major series of twenty-three volumes resulting from the World 
Archaeological Congress held in Southampton, England, in September 1986.
8question at stake is, thus, who has the right to make decisions about heritage 
in a context where the composition amongst the different parties involved 
(owners of archaeologically significant lands; dispossessed people with 
traditional claims such as Australian Aborigines and Native Americans; 
local communities, nation-states, international organisations) clearly poses a 
difficult task. Indeed, such is the difficulty to recognise w ith honest realism 
that "the question, then, is not whether archaeology and political ideology 
can be separated -  they cannot -  but, rather, how we can cope w ith the 
situation in a responsible way" (Kristiansen 1989:24).^
Acknowledging the impossibility of keeping heritage and ideology 
separate from each other means to implicitly acknowledge that vestiges of 
the past can only survive through the selective, and indeed political, action 
of conferring the status of heritage on som ething and denying it to 
something else. Now, establishing heritage through a selective process is 
w hat gives heritage its paradigmatic character. Heritage is paradigm atic 
because it provides cultural patterns (symbols, loci, rituals) gathered from 
the past which are meaningful in the present. In effect, cultural heritage 
represents, by definition, the whole repository of imagery created in every 
form of art since the beginning of mankind; it is thus clear that such a 
paradoxically immense storehouse of cultural paradigm s can reasonably 
satisfy every requirem ent of signification. M oreover, the heritage of 
complex historic societies is likely to be used as a polyvalent source of 
cultural paradigms, as shown, for instance, by the disparate usages that have 
been made of the traditions of ancient Greece and Rome.
6Fowler (1987:241) concludes his critical analysis of the utilisation of archaeology in support 
of nationalism much more optimistically, affirming that even if "the refractory and 'un-self 
evident' nature of archaeological data makes inference about the real past an extremely 
difficult undertaking at best . . .  by a continuing critical awareness of all the factors at play in 
doing of archaeology we will able to approach and provide valid explications of the real 
past."
9In sum , heritage -  as structured by the processes of selection, 
restoration and exhibition -  shows only selected and paradigmatic "slices of 
the past" which stand for the presumed historical reality. This is socially 
remarkable since, for those who trust the proclaimed authority of heritage 
institutions, these "slices of the past" represent indeed what the past was 
like. Concerned heritage managers may argue that the degree of veracity of 
a m useum  or an exhibition is a function of the honesty of scholarship 
applied to it, just as historians could say with regard to their works. But 
from a structuralist point of view, the relation between historical reality and 
any heritage display is exclusively a function of the latter's character of 
"text" or m edium  which communicate about the otherwise unknowable 
past, as theorised by Silverstone (1989:141).7 Consequently, heritage as an 
artefactual and intellectual construct resem bling the past is, in fact, a 
simulacrum of it, the representation of an original which never was 
reality in itself.8
As with the m edia in general, and visual and w ritten historical 
narratives in particular -  such as movies, docum entaries, and novels 
inspired by history and historiography itself -  cultural heritage works 
through its own peculiar strategy of representation to produce one version 
of the past distinguished by an effect of reality that in fact often blurs into a
7Baxandall (1990:34) makes this point very clearly: "It seems axiomatic that it is not 
possible to exhibit objects without putting a construction upon them. Long before the stage of 
verbal exposition by label or catalogue, exhibition embodies ordering propositions. To select 
and put forward any item for display, as something worth to looking at, as interesting, is a 
statement not only about the object but about the culture it comes from. To put three objects in a 
vitrine involves additional implications of relation. There is not exhibition w ithout 
construction and therefore - in an extended sense - appropriation."
8Jameson stigmatises this question by arguing that in the present (post-modern) epoch we are 
"condemned to seek history by way of our own pop images and simulacra of that history, 
which itself remains for ever out of reach" (1984:65).
hyper-real dimension, a "realer-than-real reconstruction [of] the authentic" 
(Eco 1987:32). This effect of historical reality is thus a contemporary creation 
shaped by the representational strategies typical of the time in which it is 
realised (for example, the concept of m useum  display is greatly changing 
with the introduction of interactive technology);9 and necessarily having, as 
I will argue, a hegemonic character. Nonetheless, we can assume that a 
lesser or greater degree of historical veracity does exist in most heritage 
displays. Now, what m atters for the present analysis is not determining the 
extent of this degree but how this degree is functional to the discourse of 
heritage.
1.3 Political Myth and Crisis of Legitimacy
In mythical accounts of the past such as legends and genealogies the 
core of historical events is constantly restructured in order to make sense of 
the present experience, like the existence of sexual taboos, social constraints, 
and so forth. Entering the field of mythology can be a very hazardous step 
because of the impressive quantity of scholarship in this regard. I shall recall 
here the opinion of a historian of classicism according to whom one of the 
main functions of m yth was "to make the past intelligible and meaningful
9Urry (1990:129-132) points out three main changes that have lately altered the concept of 
museum: a broadening of the objects displayed, as the result of the pluralisation and 
contemporarisation of the conception of history; an widening of its character (living, open-air 
and interactive museums); a change in its relationship with other social (and, I would add, 
entrepreneurial) institutions like the shop and the cafe, which have forced the m useum  to 
become more market-oriented. Indeed, the museum  shop is today an integrating - and 
sometimes, perhaps, predominant - part of the visit, and access to it is independent from the 
access to the displays. Likewise, we can imagine a future with a more functional role of the 
cafe of the museum, with waiters dressed in historical costumes and dishes based on recipes 
from Ancient Egypt to Futurist cuisine. However, this market-oriented development is yet to 
come in many Asian and also European countries -  e.g., Italy and Greece -  where the museum is 
still very much centered on the artistic, and in many cases, religious aura of the objects 
d isplayed.
by selection, by focusing on a few bits of the past which thereby acquired 
permanence, universal significance" (Finley 1965:283). The m yth's eminent 
relevance for the present makes its subject-matter (generally the deeds of 
heroes) an eternal paradigm  which does not necessarily require an 
insistence on its historicity (Tudor 1972:64). As Nietzsche (1968) said in his 
prophetic style, "the real word at last became a myth."
Common to mythology and cultural heritage as well is thus the 
processing of past events (objects in the case of heritage) in order to obtain 
selected and paradigmatic versions of history that are necessary to establish 
the origins of a given society. The original usage of the word m yth (Greek 
mythos: speech, tale) is indeed for narratives about origins. The m yth of 
origins of traditional societies has its equivalent in the myth of foundation 
of the m odern nation-state which accounts for the establishm ent of the 
polity. This political myth, though "a feature of advanced societies" (Tudor 
1972:14), shares with sacred myth the main characteristic of being a narrative 
which refers to the past but is told from the stand-point of the present, and 
in which the past is valued not for its veracity but for providing an 
explanation of the present condition through the paradigmatic content of 
the m yth itself. The story which a political m yth tells is often that "of a 
political society that existed or was created in the past and which must now 
be restored or preserved."10 Still a political myth is never the myth of a 
polity as a whole but "always the myth of a particular group" (Tudor 1972: 
138-139).
This group instrumentality is stressed too by Raoul Girardet (1986:86- 
89;179-80), who asserts the concomitance of all political myths with the
10The other most common instance of political myth is that of a society to be built in the 
future, as in the case of millenarian prophecies, revolutionary ideologies, or literary utopias.
vicissitudes of the nation, and in the end, with a crisis of legitimacy as the 
spontaneous acceptance of the political status quo; namely, the crisis which 
arises when the issues concerning the rulers' right to exert power appear to 
be no longer self-evident. Crises of legitimacy are, according to Girardet, 
inseparable from a mental shock perceivable at the personal as well as at the 
collective levels, a shock that is at the origin of political m yth. The 
developm ent of the mythical production begins w hen a phenom enon of 
non-identification takes place in the collective consciousness, when a group 
in the society recognises and defines itself as different at the same time that 
it realises -  painfully or violently -  its singularity. Political myth is thus the 
instrum ent for the reconquest of an endangered identity  as well as a 
constructive element of a specific form of social reality.
Relying both on Tudor's and Girardet's insights, I shall sum up that 
political myth expresses the ideology of a social group in a time of crisis, 
w hen that group realises that its established role is undergo ing  a 
transform ation, either because it is endangered by internal or external 
pressure, or because it is ascending to a new position of leadership. This 
means that behind the pervasiveness of the foundation m yths of ancient 
and m odern polities we can always recognize the predom inant agency of a 
single group (the Pilgrim Fathers, the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks) whose 
particular history and interests are eventually internalised, in the process of 
rewriting the biography of the nation that follows every legitimacy crisis, as 
the history and interests of the whole society. Arguing about contemporary 
mythologies some forty years ago, Roland Barthes (1972:142) wrote, "Myth 
has the task of giving a historical intention a natural justification and 
making contingency appear eternal."
The presence and the agency of a political mythology can be easily 
distinguished behind the tide of the long legitimacy crisis which runs 
th rough  Thailand's last eighty years of history. Rama Vi's egotistic 
projection of the kingdom  as nation (chat), in opposition to the call of the 
Sino-Thai bourgeoisie for a "progressive" nationalism  in the 1910s-20s; 
Phibun Songkhram's attem pt, following the 1932 revolution, to outlaw the 
monarchy and modify the character of the kingdom after the model of the 
authoritarian nation-states; Sarit Thanarat's reinstatem ent of the symbolic 
centrality of the m onarchy to legitimise his autocratic pow er in the late 
1950s; the revival of royal symbolism in the 1970s to overcome the challenge 
of emerging political subjects to the military-bureaucratic state-system: all 
these instances show the periodic reworking -  at times along orthodox lines, 
on iconoclastic lines at other times -  of the basic themes of the foundation 
m yth of the Thai kingdom , from which the contem porary polity still 
derives its symbols of legitimacy.
1.4 The Hegemonic Content of Cultural Heritage
I wish to return now to the general theoretical framework to conclude 
with an assessment about the content and function of heritage as discourse. 
As has already been pointed out, in order to establish itself the discourse of 
heritage observes, as historiography does, the indispensable condition of the 
principle of authenticity resulting from the scientific analysis of evidence. 
However, concern for authenticity vanishes in the actual purport of heritage 
in which, similar to myth, evidence of the past are not im portant per se but 
for the significations which they can convey with regard to the present. The 
discourse of heritage is thus a means to legitimise a political subject (class or 
m ovem ent, party, nation-state) by connecting its origins to the some
authoritative tradition. To this end a "staged" authenticity can, and indeed 
does work, as well as an "authentic" authenticity. Indeed, the practical 
value of heritage is by no means given by the past it comes from but, on the 
contrary, by its very presence here-and-now, a presence meaningful insofar 
as it suits a present quest for legitimisation.
As a source of cultural and political legitimacy, the discourse of 
heritage is intrinsically ideological, if ideology is defined "as the instrument 
of an appropriation of a rhetoric of legitimacy by power-holding or power- 
seeking groups" (Merquior 1979:35). In the hands of the ideologues of the 
nation-state the artistic achievements of the past embedded in the formula 
of cultural heritage become topoi, i.e., emblematic loci of the nationalist 
narrative (literally, the m yth that tells the history of the nation) which 
expresses the hegemony of the dom inant groups in terms of that shared 
patrimony of values and beliefs subtending the idea of national community.
The concept of hegemony, as elaborated by Antonio Gramsci, is 
always considered in a Marxian perspective as a function of the relations of 
production at the structural level. The critical point in Gramsci's analysis is 
that the ruling bloc's hegemony becomes pervasive and as such metabolised 
in the body of society (and not simply disguised as false consciousness) not 
so much by means of compulsion, but through consent which civil society 
(Church, School, political parties, newspapers, cultural organisations) gains 
on behalf of the dom inant fundam ental group as "intellectual and moral 
le a d e rsh ip ."11 Thus hegem ony, economically grounded and socially
^H egem ony is "the 'spontaneous' consent that the great mass of the population gives to the 
trend of social life as shaped by the dom inant fundam ental group. This consent is 
'historically ' due to the ascendancy (and hence, to the reliance) that the dom inant 
fundamental group gains from its position and function in the field of production" (Gramsci 
1949:9. My translation).
Consolidated through consent, not only allows the ruling class to exert social 
control w ithout direct coercion, but to actively make its values and beliefs 
that of the subordinated classes. That is why the political leadership }f the 
dom inant group should never be separated from its intellectual leadership; 
and why revolutionary struggle to win power always implies struggle for 
the assim ilation and "ideological" conquest of intellectuals, whose huge 
growth in the democratic-bureaucratic state-systems is due not so much to 
the social requirem ents of production, as to the political needs cf the 
dom inant fundam ental group (Gramsci 1949:9-13).
Intellectuals are those who materialise cultural heritage. Artists and 
architects, archaeologists and anthropologists, historians and art historians, 
m useum  curators and conservators, and even teachers and priests are 
responsible for creating, restoring, disclosing, glossing, explaining and 
vulgarising the cultural production of the past making it the object of public 
respect. After all, pushing adm iration for the arts is a way to produce 
consensus; and since hegem ony is carried on th rough  intellectual 
leadership, formal dem ocratic societies cannot do w ithout artists and 
intellectuals.12 Yet intellectuals do not constitute an autonomous class, they 
are, in Gramsci's reading, "organic" to the social group they belong to.1' It is 
not surprising, then, that museum displays all over the world present, in 
H orne's (1984:1) words, "dominant versions of reality [that] tend tc suit 
dom inant groups and to uphold a certain social order."
^D icta to rsh ips too can hardly do without them, but in that case the value of ertistic 
production is undermined by its overtly apolegetic intent.
13We may agree that, generally speaking, the relatively free position of artists and 
intellectuals within the bounds of capitalist systems acknowledging the governing prirciples 
of costitutionalism  and parliam entarism  can account for "non-consenting" or "comter- 
hegemonic" cultural productions.
Indeed, the m useum  is the favourite locus of the reification of the 
m yth of the nation, a temple-like architecturally designated area where the 
"secular ritual of citizenship" is performed (Duncan 1991), the forge where 
the m odel of national identity is cast th rough  the juxtaposition of 
contrasting images of "sameness" and "otherness." Often born out of 
private royal collections, public museums, first established in Europe as a 
result of the secularisation of knowledge generated by the Enlightenment, 
have however retained as central "the function of the princely gallery as a 
ceremonial reception hall wherein the state presented and idealised itself" 
(Duncan 1991:93). Transplanted in colonial dominions, the m useum  had 
been an instrument, with the map and the census, to legitimise authority by 
cataloguing the local cultural, geographic and hum an resources, and thus 
defining the colony itself, and the post-colonial nation-state that followed 
(Anderson 1991). Likewise, in Lasswell's (1979) analysis, m onum ental 
architecture as "the signature of power" holds a central role amongst those 
rituals and objects of public adm iration (miranda) which add, in the 
symbology of politics, to the articles of faith about the legitimacy of power 
(icredenda), and it "serves as a focus for the populace's identification with 
the state" (Miller 1987:124). Monuments, official buildings, and the form of 
the city itself,14 are active elements of hegemonic assertion by territorially 
propagandising, w hether through pure symbolism or actual function, the 
values informing the policies of the ruling classes.15
14Large avenues and boulevards, generally found in capital-cities, are clearly symbolic 
representations of the nation's greatness. For example, Paris' grand boulevards were built as 
part of Prefect Haussm ann’s reshaping of the city which magnified France's colonial fate in 
the second half of the last century; the same boulevards, by allowing the easy repression of 
popular demonstrations, underlined practically the reactionary character of France's Second 
Empire.
15A few years ago in Italy, a republic by popular referendum since 1946, the proposal to erect 
a monument to the anarchist Gaetano Bresci (who in 1900 killed King Umberto I) in his birth­
place gave rise to a heated debate, and the proposal was finally abandoned. With regards to 
another example of oppositional statuary, we can notice that the monumental grave of Karl 
Marx in London has not to face the iconoclasm recently suffered by similar monuments in ex-
The hegemonic content of a "world heritage" is of course the more 
arduous to discern because of the supra-national and apparently  non­
political nature of the organisations involved: UNESCO by means of the 
In terna tional C ouncil of M onum ents and  Sites (ICOMOS);16 Non- 
Governmental Organisations; private foundations. Moreover, the practical 
aspect of preserving the very existence of m onuments of antiquity seems to 
be more compelling than the related question of who is going to gain w hat 
in these operations. All of us too, as individuals and "citizens of the world," 
are sincerely worried about the destiny of relics of the past which induce us 
to travel, to visit places, to take pictures, and in the end, to feel the emotion 
of attending the great show of history. It is nevertheless clear that the 
W orld Heritage listing is a way to confer legitimacy and international 
recognition upon the local governments that are called to cooperate with 
restoring program m es.17 Thus, to take a Southeast Asian example, in spite 
of the continuous violation of hum an rights by the m ilitary junta which 
rules Myanmar (Burma), the restoration of Pagan, hit by an earthquake in 
1975 and recently listed as World Heritage site, has significantly benefited 
from international aid.
communist countries, where in fact they were symbols of the ruling power. For the irony of 
history, the greatest critic of capitalism is eventually honoured by a monument in the country 
of capitalism 's birth.
16ICOMOS is a non-governmental organisation established in 1964 as an advisory body under 
UNESCO. National committees for ICOMOS presently exist in sixty-two countries.
17That the listing of World Heritage i s  a power to carefully administrate is acknowledged 
by Dr. Roland Silva himself, President of ICOMOS: "Our proposal is that in 1993 no cultural 
m onum ent or site be entertained for nomination until the professionals of ICOMOS have 
studied such nominations, as if it were a medical patient, and only on such inspections the 
proposals had been submitted for nomination or ejection. In terms of the expenses of the 
Specialist, such cost can be met by the host country as in the case with most UNESCO 
missions. Travel fares and professional fees need to be found through the host country or the 
W orld Heritage Body. This is, indeed, the professional way that M onuments and Sites 
should be handled at Nomination levels." (FAD 1992:55)
One question generally uncritically taken for granted concerns the 
w ide recognition of approaches such as conservation and restoration of 
artistic artefacts that are, in fact, historically rooted only in the European 
tradition. And albeit with its best intentions World Heritage listing can be 
seen as the a ttem pt to preserve the heritage of different societies as 
patrim ony of the whole of hum ankind, freeing it from the parochiality of 
the singular state, still it is according to hegemonic param eters of technical 
and scientific reliability, involving the status of a nation as m odern and 
civilised, that the idea of world heritage is implemented and valued .18
Still, perhaps the most significant point regards the feeling of 
nostalgia which some observers see as boosting the present interest for 
heritage, nostalgia explained by the crisis in reality of the contemporary age 
and the need for a past conveying certainties.19 Though nostalgia is typical 
of every generation, at least as the very hum an feeling of regret for lost 
youth, it is nevertheless true that, in an age of fast and often amazing 
historical changes, an idealised vision of the past as a valuable repository of 
traditions is likely to be transferred from conservative elites to mass 
cu ltu re .20 And the "heritage industry," selling to the tourist consumer its
18This point is clearly made in the following statement of Prof. Ishizawa, director of the 
Institute of Asian Cultures of Sophia University, Tokyo: "The preservation and restoration 
project for historic cities clearly contributes to raising the academic standards of a nation. . . . 
The work at Borobudur has brought Indonesians to the summit of world competence in 
restoration techniques. The project also promotes interdisciplinary activities related to 
preservation and restoration, as well as to the reorganization and improvement of national 
research systems. . . . Perhaps the most im portant effect of the successful Borobudur 
Preservation Project is the solid confidence it implanted in the minds of the Indonesian people 
and those of other Asian countries as well." (Ishizawa et al. 1988:22-23)
19T o put this in Baudrillard's words (quoted in Birch 1993:6), "When the real is no longer 
what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of 
origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity."
20Hewinson (1987) shows the correspondance between the boom in the early 1980s of the 
British heritage industry, marketing a particularly nostalgic version of the past, and the 
premiership of Margaret Thatcher, when consensus to conservative policies was won through
"improved version of the past" (Hewinson 1989:10), can rarely afford to offer
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too m uctr controversial or disturbing insights into the history of peoples 
and nations. Furthermore, the process of reading the heritage "text" by the 
tourist "spectator" implies an interaction which alters every single element 
involved; the tourist becomes an archaeologist, the indigenous citizen a 
heritage in terpreter, the relic is faked by its replica, and our sense of 
historical perspective is blurred into a present "which has taken the stigma 
of the past" (Ankersmit 1989:151).
So far, I have attem pted to present a critical approach to the question 
of cultural heritage. In the next chapters the analysis will move to the 
specific case of Thailand, where heritage has become a key concept in 
statements about national identity and in tourist promotion as well. Signals 
are indeed contradictory. It is now clear that interpreting heritage is always a 
way to interpret history, and this has led to debates among academics, 
intellectuals and state officials about the character that the Thai past should 
have. And while the majority of the Thai people, happily caught up in the 
task of becoming "modern," do not seem to worry much about the loss of 
aspects of their cu lture valued as "traditional," they have become 
increasingly surrounded by simulacra of a fictitious "Olde Siam" which 
mirror an idyllic golden age. What is certainly true is that, at a time when 
aspects of the past are continually transiting from the plane of daily reality to 
that of memory as a result of economic and social changes, the questions 
concerning national heritage in Thailand today have an undeniable political 
valency.
a nationalist revival which included the royal wedding of Prince Charles and the war 
against Argentina for the property of the Falklands (Malvinas) islands.
2. The Politics of Thai Heritage
Art and culture [sinlapa watanatham] reflect national identity [ekkalak khong chat] 
and form part of the historical heritage of every society. It is also generally accepted 
that art and culture play an important part in the meeting together of the populace, 
creating a sense of national unity. This unity will result in peaceful and orderly co­
existence, making possible the preservation of the national integrity. Artistic and 
cultural preservation, research, dissemination and promotion have been entrusted to 
the Fine Arts Department. Its most important role is to maintain and preserve all 
aspects of the national artistic and cultural heritage as well as possible within the 
rapidly changing conditions of modem society. (FAD 1992:16)
This excerpt from a lavishly illustrated book published by the Fine 
Arts Departm ent (FAD) overtly spells out the aims that Thai heritage is 
called to serve: to create a feeling of unity, internal order and national 
integrity. This might seem to overstate UNESCO policy but the book, in fact, 
celebrates the 1991 inclusion of the archaeological cities of Sukhothai 
(including Si Satchanalai and Kam phaeng Phet) and A yutthaya in the 
World Heritage list. The forest area of Thung Yai-Huay Khakhaeng was also 
nom inated a W orld H eritage natural site on that occasion. Such a 
confidence in the pow er of ruins by the local authorities is indeed 
admirable, and it may contrast with the fact that in Thailand, during the past 
twenty years, the threat of coercion and repression has been always intensely 
present, and in few occasions actually deployed. Still, the following 
discussion puts forward the thesis that the most recent and articulate 
formulation of a state policy on cultural heritage, albeit incapsulated in the 
long-term project of nation-building started last century, has been issued 
precisely in response to the deep crisis of legitimacy suffered by the Thai 
polity in the 1970s.
2.1 The Quest for a "National Heritage"
It follows from the argum ents earlier that the program m atic and 
purposeful valuation of cultural heritage is instrum ental to the process of 
nation-building. In Siam this process started in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and was, until 1932, led and achieved by the absolute 
m onarchy through the imposition of its authority over peripheral semi- 
autonom ous principalities. Politically as well as culturally, the obvious 
result of this process was "the conceptual conflation of m onarchy and 
nation" (Anderson 1978:213). Not unlike the W estern cases described by 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), the Chakri kings m anipulated the past both 
to sanction change by means of the authority of historical custom and to 
sanction continuity by means of the norm ative values of an invented 
tradition. The transformation of the prem odern kingdom into a centralised 
state was legitim ised through the purely Thai m yth of foundation of 
Sukhothai placed side by side with the Buddhist-Brahmanic cosmology of 
Khmer origin which since the time of Ayutthaya had provided political 
legitimation and a cultural identity for the monarchy.
Accordingly, a royal antiquarianism developed within the circle of the 
Siamese elite, as exem plified by King M ongkut's (Rama IV) own 
archaeological discoveries and Chulalongkorn's (Rama V) creation of the 
A ntiquarian  Society (Borankadi samoson) in 1907.21 This antiquarian
2 ^Pisit (1988) transla tes it as A rchaeological Society, no ting  how ever that for 
Chulalongkorn, the term "archaeology" (borankadi) covered everything ancient, including 
history, literature and tradition. I prefer therefore, following Byrne (1993), to render 
borankadi as antiquarianism, which does not imply the discursive property of an established 
scientific discipline like archaeology to make "objective” statements.
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interest assum ed a more definite state dim ension in 1911, when King 
Vajiravudh (Rama VI) established the core of the Department of Fine Arts, 
followed in 1925 by the Archaeological Service, created after the model of 
the Ecole Fran^aise d'Extreme-Orient and the British Royal Society. In the 
eyes of the W estern-educated elite ruins were hence no longer evidence of 
the Buddhist law of impermanence (anitcang, from Pali anicca), but material 
proof of the imported pattern of linear historical development centered on 
the nation-state. The fact that this model was not imposed by W estern 
foreign rule, as in other Buddhist polities such as Burma and Sri Lanka, but 
adopted by the ruling elite itself could make sense of the fact that Thailand, 
while showing a greater continuity in its political structure, has in fact been 
more open to certain features of W esternisation than its neighbours, as 
Tambiah (1976:525) has suggested.
While the leaders of the 1932 coup doubtless aimed to disrupt the 
"conceptual conflation" of monarchy and nation, the evaluation of that 
event as a w atershed of Thai history has proven to be extrem ely 
problem atic.22 On the one hand, 1932 undeniably had a strong impact on 
the m onarchy as an institution, whose actual and symbolic power was 
virtually annihilated -  due also to dynastic questions -  for more than two 
decades, from 1932 to the late 1950s. It is important to be reminded that the 
creation of a national identity, whose legacy still persists, was achieved 
during the 1940s through Phibun's prem iership in open antagonism with 
the monarchy: traditional court ceremonies were suspended, the Ministry of 
the Royal Household declassed, the palace's employees greatly reduced, the 
display of King Prajadhipok's (Rama VII) images prohibited and his 
property confiscated, and a member of the royal family, Prince Rangsit, a
22See Bateson's (1993) review of three recent Thai books on the 1932 coup which, with other 
contemporaneous works, offer new data, perspectives and interpretations of that event.
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Chulalongkorn 's son, even sentenced to death (later com m uted to life 
im prisonm ent) for conspiracy (Pitipat 1990:26-27). Phibun's rhetorical 
advocacy of a new era marking a discontinuity with the past (Thamsook 
1978:235) went as far as, according to Anderson (1977:21), delineating the 
separation of the ideas of nation and monarchy, "with the state (essentially 
the armed forces) as representative of the one and guardian of the other" 
(orig. emphasis). On the level of the Thai collective imaginaiy^this task was 
accomplished by the historical writings of Luang Wichit W athakan by 
braiding together the narrative plot of "dynasty" and that of "nation-state" 
(Reynolds 1992).
On the other hand, however, the coup itself was at the root of the 
great ambiguity lying at the foundations of the Thai political system born 
out of the ending of the absolute monarchy. As Cohen (1991:26) clearly 
spells out:
While [the revolution of 1932] abolished the king's absolute power, the constitution 
confirmed his status as the nation's sovereign; but, concomitantly, it conferred 
sovereignty upon the nation itself. The principles of legitimation, the royal and the 
democratic, co-exist in modern Thailand without their relationship having ever been 
fully explicated.
The compromise expressed by the constitution of December 1932 not only 
explains the survival of the Thai monarchy, but its eventual resurgence as 
active political subject. In fact, instead of removing the monarchy as the 
major symbol of the past they were opposing, the prom oters of the 1932 
coup chose to retain it as source of political legitimation. Ben A nderson 
(1977:21) has incisively argued: "The leaders of the 1932 coup decisively put 
an end to the m onarchy's direct, practical pow er w ithout, however, 
attem pting any serious or perm anent undermining of its cultural centrality 
and 'nationalist' prestige."
The failure to establish in the symbolic sphere a myth of foundation 
purporting and prom oting the new political order explains why the quest 
for political legitim ation has rested, even after 1932, upon the Buddhist- 
royal heritage that the m ilitary have attem pted to appropriate. This is 
show n, for instance, by the large-scale restorations of religious buldings 
implemented by the post-war Phibun government -  in 1951 and 1956, two 
troubled years for Phibun, 1,117 and 1,239 temples respectively were restored 
(Thak 1978:717); and by Phibun's personal sponsorship  of the 25th 
centennial celebration of the Buddhist Era in 1957, to which the monarchy 
replied by distancing itself from the ceremonies.
It was, however, only in the 1970s that Thailand experienced a real 
crisis of legitim acy of authoritarian-paternalistic  rule w hen the long 
established hegemony of the local elite was endangered by a large popular 
m ovem ent composed of student, worker and farm er associations.23 The 
1970s crisis had its structural roots in the rapid modernisation begun by the 
Sarit governm ent in the late 1950s, and in particular in the increase of 
graduates from secondary and tertiary institutions. Albeit unm istakeably 
to ta litarian , the Sarit regim e, which survived him  until 1973, had 
engineered the restoration of the symbolic preeminence of the monarchy as 
a way of overcoming its weakness of legitimacy. The revival of royal 
cerem onies and the public  activism  of the m onarchs w ere the 
epiphenomena of the alliance that occurred after 1957 between the throne 
and the new military leaders to their mutual advantage (Thak 1979:309-325;
23Girling, in a Gramsci-inspired analysis, has proposed three reasons for the Thai elite 
hegemony: dynastic modernisation, late social differentiation, and ethnic division of labor. 
These factors being rooted in the history of pre-1932 absolutist Siam, Girling sees the 
bureacratic elite, whose hegemony was disputed by the democratic movement in the 1970s, as 
having simply "inherited the power and the authority of the monarchy" (1984: 388-89).
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397-402).24 This laid the basis for the reintegration of the monarchy into the 
political arena.
Thus, w hen in the 1970s the climax reached by the political 
confrontation required  a resolute intervention, King Bhumibol acted 
unfailingly as deus ex machina. His personal intervention was manifest as 
support in favour of civil society in 1973,2S as well as of its brutal repression 
three years later.26 As Morell and Chai-anan (1981:68) wrote: "The King had 
remained the head of state, the focus of his people's loyalty and cohesion, 
the fount of legitimacy." Now, if legitimation issues from the monarch, 
whoever opposes a legitimacy so defined is liable to the most slanderous 
charge, that of lese-majeste. It was exactly on the grounds of such an 
accusation that army, police and param ilitary groups opened fire on the
24Thak (1979:310) stresses the differences in the personal history and political culture 
between Pibul and those of his generation, who had participated in the overthrow of the 
monarchy in 1932, and the following leaders like Sarit, Thanom and Praphat, who came from 
a different generation and had an entirely Thai background, which made it easier for them to 
make accommodation with the throne. "The king still had an aura of sacredness and purity to 
these elite, and its relationship with the throne reflected this."
2r,"The king persuaded Thanom and Praphat to resign and, with Narong, to leave the country. 
Then, in a solemn address to the nation, he announced on October 14 the appointment of Sanya 
Thammasak as prime minister. The military was in eclipse, the king was at the apogee of his 
reign, and the students had triumphed over tyranny" (Girling 1981:193).
26”At a time when our country is being continually threatened with aggression by the enemy, 
our very freedom and existence as Thais may be distroyed if Thai people fail to realize their 
patriotism  and their solidarity in resisting the enemy. . . . Accordingly, the Thai military 
has the most important role in defense of our country at all times, ready always to carry out 
its duty to protect the country." Excerpt from the King's address of the 3rd of Dec. 1976, 
translated and quoted by Girling (1981:215). The original in Thai appeared in Siam 
Chotmaihet, Dec. 2-8, 1976. Girling (208) observes that : "Throughout 1975 and 1976, it would 
appear, the king became increasingly convinced that the results of an open political system 
threatened the very foundations of the monarchy; that student, labor, and farmer leaders 
were 'communist agitators' or were influenced by them; and that even the demise of the 
Chakri dynasty, following the recent end of the m onarchy in Laos, was a distinct 
possibility." Keyes (1987:96; 100) recalls that in that period, the King and the Queen used to 
appear from time to time with the uniform of the Village Scouts, a royalist m ovem ent 
established by the Border Patrol Police, which in turn had very close relations with the 
royal family; and that the appointment of Thanin - prime minister from October 1976 to 
October 1977 - was precisely the choice of the royal family.
students w ithin the precinct of Thammasat University the morning of the 
6th of October, 1976.
Like all the most dramatic instances of change resulting from crises of 
legitimacy, the struggle for an "alternative hegemony" which took place 
betw een 1973 and 1976 was a totalising phenom enon which extended to 
several levels, from work relations to family relationships (cf. Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981). In section 1.3 crisis of legitimacy was identified as the 
stirring factor for the development of political myth, which is the vehicle 
for a ruling or rule-seeking group to sustain and justify its claim to power. 
Now, I would argue that the shock brought on by the 1973 crisis put in place 
a m ythologising process expressing, in term s of political imagery, the 
struggle which was fought, on the actual plane of a class war, between the 
ruling and the progressive blocs to defend or assert their hegemony. Morell 
and C hai-anan (1981:175) have acknow ledged the im portance of the 
symbolic level in the political confrontation of those years:
Many liberals were embarrassed about using the traditional, national symbols for 
political purpose, even if this would have been effective. In their view, this kind of 
tactic was prem odern, and did not belong in political discourse. A lthough they 
considered themselves true nationalists who loved their king and respected the 
Buddhist religion, they were unwilling to "wrap themselves in the flag." In this 
regard, of course, they were simply indicating their lack of understanding of the true 
nature of modern Thai society, in which these prem odern symbols retain enormous 
political salience.
It is, however, hard to understand how the democratic movement could 
have not blamed those nationalist symbols which themselves represented 
the ancien regime that it was trying to overthrow . The d isruptive 
potentiality of the then very popular radical and Marxist literature which 
had been banned for a long time (Reynolds and Hong 1983) -  particularly 
Chit Phum isak's "The Real Face of Thai Feudalism  Today" (Chomna  
sakdina thai nai pat chub an) -  was correctly valued in Anderson's timely 
analysis of the 1976 coup: "Simply to use a vocabulary of social processes and
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economic forces was to refuse centrality to Thai monarchs as heroes in or 
embodiments of national history" (Anderson 1977:27).
The annihilation of the democratic movem ent through m urder and 
harsh repression in the years 1975-77 was thus followed by the pervasive 
reaffirmation of the notion of national identity. This notion defines by a 
negative criterion its antithesis, namely, communism, that in Thai official 
discourse "is not categorised as the opposite num ber of capitalism , 
bourgeois, liberal or any political party [but as] an enemy of Thainess, that is 
to say, external to Thainess" (Thongchai 1988:420). The question which 
Morell and Chaijanan (1981:309) identified as "the core of the m odern Thai 
political dilemma, [the] search for a new national identity" was temporarily 
answered by refurbishing the values and the attached symbols of the royalist 
slogan "nation, religion, m onarchy" (chat, sasana, phramahakasat),27 
"watchword of the post-1976 coup regimes" (Girling 1981:139).28
Reynolds (1991:14-17) makes a precis of the stages of the state cultural 
campaign started soon after the coup of October 1976 to reaffirm the official 
notion of Thai identity. In January 1977 the Office of the Prime Minister 
began publishing the monthly magazine "Thai Identity" (Ekkalak thai); in 
February 1979 the National Culture Commission was appointed by royal 
decree; at the same time the government established the National Identity 
Board (Khanakammakan scemsang ekkalak khong chat), charged with the 
prom otion of national culture; in January 1981 the Board started the 
p u b lica tio n  of "Thai M agazine" (Warasan thai). Thereafter a
27The origin of this slogan is usually ascribed to the anglophile King Vajiravudh who, 
according to Vella (1978:xvi), coined it after the British "God, King, Country."
28Notably, in the monarchical revival there was no trace of the term "constitution," 
introduced in public life and activities as the fourth pillar of Thai national identity during 
the 1930s (Barme 1993).
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subcommission on national ideology issued a eight-fold definition of nation 
as 1) territory, 2) populace, 3) independence and sovereignty, 4) government 
and adm inistration, 5) religion, 6) monarchy, 7) culture, 8) dignity, even if 
this definition was not exhaustive.
My point here is that the emphasis on national heritage has been part 
of this instrum ental cultural policy implemented after the crushing of the 
democratic movement as a means for the reestablishment of the hegemony 
of the dom inant elite through the revival of the m yth that legitimises its 
rule: the myth of the always independent and sovereign Thai nation which 
will find a successful future by following the same course which has already 
provided a successful past (escaping from colonialism, from communism, 
and eventually from third-world status). It is obvious that, from a historical 
perspective where signs of discontinuity such as revolution or civil war are 
erased by state discourses, it is possible to regard even the most remote past 
as a constituting and legitimising part of the present. The Thai nation, born 
according to the nationalist narrative with the kingdom of Sukhothai, has 
always retained throughout seven centuries of developm ent the same 
political and religious creeds: monarchy and Buddhism. This asserted 
continuity has m ade Sukhothai the foundation m yth of the m odern Thai 
polity, the prototype of a golden age to restore after the crisis.
The m onum ent to King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai as father of 
the nation towers today w ithin the precinct of w hat is the emblem of 
cultural heritage as a prim ary instrum ent of state rhetoric, Sukhothai 
Historical Park. It should be noted that the implementation of this and the 
other three parks of Muang Sing, Phanom Rung and Ayutthaya began in 
1977, with the inclusion of their projects in the Fourth National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (1977-81). This meant a considerable effort in
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the m idst of a serious economic crisis, and at a time when the priority was 
fighting a Com m unist Party of Thailand at the height of its popularity. 
Particularly in the case of Sukhothai, the project has also been a means for 
the governm ent to obtain international support for its cultural policy, a 
su p p o rt culm inated in the 1991 W orld H eritage nom inations. The 
following Fifth Plan (1981-86) brought to nine the num ber of the historical 
parks w ith the inclusion of Si Satchanalai, Kam phaeng Phet, Phim ai, Si 
Thep, Phra Nakonkhiri. In the same period a committee headed by the then 
prim e m inister Prem  Tinsulanonda took on the organisation  of the 
Ratanakosin Bicentenary, which brought about the restoration of the main
bicentenary of the House of Chakri and of the capital itself, had a large 
popu lar attendance which highlighted the recom pacted national unity 
around the institution of the monarchy.29 This unity formed the basis for 
the economic boom and the injection of self-esteem which have marked the
From Buddhist kingdom to m odern nation-state (Keyes 1987) and 
from kingdom to NIC-dom (Reynolds 1991), the Thai monarchy has been 
able to fully regain, after the eclipse of the 1903s-50s, its centrality as symbol 
of continuity , delineator of the lim its of innovation, and u ltim ate 
legitim ator of change (cf. Eisenstadt 1973). The interlacing betw een the 
House of Chakri, the foundation myth of the Thai polity, and national 
heritage which materialies that myth is clearly seen in the appointm ent of
29The aims of the 1982 celebrations were clearly spelled out by a government publication: 
"Seven objectives of the Bicentenary as follows: to promote the Thai image and identity; to 
honour and commemorate the Great Chakri Dynasty [sic]; to make better known the 
contribution of religions [sic] to the nation and society; to revive and promote the ancient 
culture and heritage; to strengthen national unity among Thais both within and outside the 
kingdom; to create in young people a proud and positive feeling toward their country; and to 
encourage both Thais and foreign residents to work together in projects which will benefit the 
Kingdom, the national security, and the people" (Foreign News Division 1982:24).
monumei great 1982 celebrations, prom oted as the
1980s.
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Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn -  who holds a M.A. in oriental epigraphy 
from Silpakorn University -  as guardian of the cultural patrim ony of the 
country. This appointm ent followed a m ore im portant one, in 1977, of 
Sirindhorn as crown princess, next in line to her brother in succession to the 
throne. This decision was taken as a consequence of the rum ours about the 
crown prince at a moment when the monarchy strongly needed to regain 
popularity after the events of 1976. From her regular attendance at openings 
and art performances to her research as a Ph. D. student, Sirindhorn gives 
the Chakri commitment to national heritage all the authority of her double 
role as scholar and as princess (and possible heir).30
The national heritage had thus become a favourite locus of the 
nationalist narrative that, after the achievement of social pacification and 
the obliteration of the 1970s crisis, has been built, more or less explicitly, on 
the parallel between the greatness of the past and the exceptional economic 
growth of the 1980s. As the critique in Chapter 1 has pointed out, the 
discourse of heritage affects not only the internal propagation of dom inant 
values bu t also the international status of a nation as m odern and 
developed. Since the mid-1980s the aim of businessmen and politicians has 
been to make Thailand the leading country w ithin m ainland Southeast 
Asia, a region whose full economic potential is still to be realised. But such 
an aspiration requires a proper degree of influence, even in terms of cultural 
patronage: Thailand today, thanks to its level of development, can present
30It is no secret that many in Thailand would prefer to see Princess Sirindhorn rather than 
her m uch less beloved brother succeeding King Phum ipon. This apparently  rem ote 
eventuality, cause of excitement in every circle of Thai society, is even insinuated in another 
government publication: "Throughout Thai history, succession to the throne has always been 
through the male line; recent constitutional am endm en ts, however, now stipulate that if 
there is no male heir, the Parliament may approve succession of a royal daughter to become 
the ruling monarch, thus breaking a tradition of 700 years standing and providing further 
proof of the monarchy's modern views." (National Identity Board 1991:47). For an example of 
the identification of Princess Sirindhorn with the protection of the national cultural heritage 
cf. Silapakorn (1991, 34:1).
itself as a model and a sponsor for its neighbours in the field of heritage 
management. An example of that is offered by the new headquarters of the 
Seameo Project in Archaeology and Fine Arts (SPAFA, in Si Ayutthaya 
Road, nearby the National Library and the FAD's Archaeological Section): 
opened in N ovem ber 1992, the building is "hosted by the Royal Thai 
Government," as the commemorative plate states. And this has m eant that 
the m ultinational SPAFA is housed in a building with typical, although 
modernised, Thai architectural features.
Meanwhile, in a society that is enjoying, at least in part, a growth in 
the standard of living, the larger availability of economic means and leisure 
time is making more and more people interested in the heritage of their 
country. Such interest is reflected in the by now fully developed Thai 
cultural industry: books and magazines, exhibitions and travels with a focus 
on the arts are becoming normal features in the life of Bangkok's middle- 
class. Beginning with the 1970s, the revival of national heritage led to 
publishing ventures like those of the monthly magazines "Ancient City" 
(Muang Boran) since 1974, and "Art and Culture" (Sinlapa Watanatham) 
since 1979, which set the tone for art journals in Thailand, directly 
intervening on questions of restoration and art history and theory. The 
state also, through the m any FAD publications, has its share in this 
flourishing market. To mention just two examples, in 1989 the periodical 
"Heritage" (Moradok) was established, and in 1990 the monographs of the 
"Thai Culture Series," first published in 1960s, were republished in a new 
full-color format at very affordable prices. Indeed, images of a mythical- 
historical repertoire are found today in an array of products: from t-shirts 
printed with art objects, such as a tea-cup of the Chulalongkorn era (actually 
an item of chinoiserie), to new year cards with mural-like drawings inspired 
by an idyllic version of Siamese antiquity. Likewise, Prasat Phimai is used as
the backdrop for a sm art television advertisem ent for Fuji film, where a 
contem porary pop-singer and his band come to life from the bas-reliefs of 
the temple.
W hilst som e of the questions related  to the m arketing  and 
consum ption of cultural sites are at stake in the next chapter, the following 
two sections provide detail of the politics of Thai heritage, looking at what 
can be broadly defined as the two "parties" involved in the struggle for the 
a ttribu tion  of m eanings to heritage, nam ely, the "governm ent party" 
constituted by the FAD, and that of its critics.
2.2 National Heritage and Its Preservers
The FAD (Krom sinlapakorn), under the Ministry of Education, is the 
governm ent office entrusted with "the responsibility of protecting and 
preserving every type of art in Thai heritage to m aintain the national 
cultural identity" National Museums Division 1991:47). First established in 
March 1911 by Vajiravudh, who ordered the transfer of the royal court 
craftsmen and the Museum Department from the Ministry of Education to 
the new body, the FAD was subsequently disbanded in 1926 when King 
Prajadhipok amalgam ated it with the Royal Museum and the Vachirayan 
Library, founded in 1905, into the Royal Institute (Silpakornstan). At the 
head of the new institu tion  Rama VII appoin ted  Prince D am rong 
Rajanubhab, the famous brother of Chulalongkorn, who, as M inister of 
Interior from 1892 to 1915, was the architect of the centralisation of the 
provincial adm inistration. Damrong, officially regarded as "the father of 
Thai history" (Breazeale 1971), had already been appointed, after his 
resignation from the Ministry, as the chairman of the Vachirayan Library, 
whose epigraphic section had been directed since 1917 by George Coedes. In
his new office Damrong gave shape to the main cultural institutions of the 
kingdom that were to be inherited by the post-1932 governments.
In May 1933, after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, 
the FAD -  including w hat became the National Museum and the National 
Library -  was reinstated under the direction of Wichit W atthakan (arguably 
the most influential Thai intellectual of this century),31 and finally began its 
activities in January 1934. Barme (1993:114-115) argues that behind the 
reestablishment of the Department were not only political aims but hopes of 
commercial benefits related to tourism and the sale of crafts. After several 
revisions of structure, the FAD was finally transferred in 1958 to the 
Ministry of Education. According to the 1991 Royal Decree, it is divided into 
12 divisions: the office of the secretary, finance, personnel m anagem ent, 
music and dram a, the national archives, archaeology, national m useums, 
literature and history, art education, architecture, the national library, and 
traditional arts.
The FAD's Division of N ational M useum s (Kong phiphithaphan  
sathan hsengchat) is articulated into nine sub-divisions.32 Amongst these 
are the Bangkok Sub-Division of N ational M useum s (including the 
National Gallery, the Silpa Bhirasri Memorial, the Royal Barges, the Royal 
Elephant and Benchamabophit National Museums), and the Sub-Division 
of the Regional National M useums, which manages thirty-one m useum s 
allocated to nine regions.33 Albeit definitely less num erous in the southern
31 W ichit was acting Director-General during the period 1933-35, before his official 
appointment in 1935 (Apinan 1992:29).
32These are: General Adm inistration; Export Permit; Curatorial Staff; Registration and 
Storage; Conservation; Exhbition Technique; Education and Public Relations; National 
Museum Bangkok; Regional National Museums.
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peninsula (five out of thirty-one), national m useum s are thus a common 
presence in many provincial cities, where they remind the population of the 
unitary, if not homogenous, cultural character of the nation. Thai national 
museums owned in 1991 a total of 100,711 artefacts and employed 873 people 
(including officers, perm anent and tem porary personnel); in the same year, 
there were 1,339,409 visitors, of which 289,928 were foreigners (National 
M useum s Division 1991: 35;22;34). N ational m useum s are open from 
W ednesday to Sunday (excluding national holidays), from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., 
and their admission-fee is 5 Baht for nationals and 10 Baht for foreigners, 
with the exception of the Bangkok National M useum which charges double 
the amount. Students and Buddhist monks enter free of charge. The most 
recent museum, the National Museum of Thai Rice Farmers in Suphanburi 
province, has been inaugurated in 1993. But in spite of the great role that 
rice cultivation has played economically and socially in Thai history, this 
m useum  is merely a celebration of a period spent by Crown Prince 
Vajiralongkorn in 1986 working in the paddy fields of the region.
From the legislative point of view, the Act on Monuments, Antiques, 
Objects of Art and National M useum s, B.E. 2504 (1961) provides the 
guideline for the conservation of cultural resources through their listing on 
the National Register of Ancient Sites.34 Pisit (1988:5) remarks that the list 
in fact "includes almost only sites relating to Buddhism." In 1985 the 
sections 10 and 11 of the 1961 Act have been updated in the 21 points of the 
Regulations for M onum ent Conservation, commonly referred to as the
33The regions and their respective num ber of museums as following: l)Central region: 5 
museums; 2) Western region: 6 museums; 3) Lower Northern region: 4 museums; 4) Upper 
Northern: 4 museums; 5) Eastern: 1 museum; 6) Lower Northeastern: 4 museums; 7) Upper 
Northeastern: 2 musuems; 8) Upper Southern: 3 museums; 9) Lower Southern: 2 museums.
34For the text of this act, cf. Government Gazette, 78:66, August 9, B.E. 2054 (1961).
"Bangkok Charter" (text in Ishizawa et al. 1988:120-22). Among them, 
articles 1,11,12 and 14 state:
I. "Conservation" refers to the act of keeping and maintaining a monument in order to 
retain its values. This comprises protection, maintenance, preservation, restoration and 
repair.
A. "Preservation" refers to the act of keeping the monument in its original state and 
preventing it from further damage.
B. "Restoration" refers to the act of putting back to a former state.
C. "Repair" refers to the act of repairing and improving a monument to its original 
state. However, the original and the newly constructed part should be in harmony with 
each other and be detectable from each other.
II . The conservation of parts of the most valuable paintings, sculptures and antiquity 
which are attached to or placed w ithin a monument should only be dealt w ith by 
m eans of preservation or stabilisation to retain their original value as m uch as 
possible. This is except consecrated objects which have been worshipped continuously. 
It should be approved by the committee before the work is carried out.
12. The conservation of ruins should be enhanced by collecting ancient objects and 
fragments for complete or partial restoretion. It is possible to reconstruct the missing 
parts necessary for such restoration.
14. Archaeological buildings that are consecrated places well-known to the local 
people must be restored without any alteration in colour or style since it may diminish 
their values or credibility of [sic] the people.
The drawing up of this code followed the criticism caused by the restorations
carried out at Sukhothai since 1977, that Srisakara (1987:34) stigmatised as
the '"legally authorised' process of destroying ancient and historical sites."
The response of the FAD to the charge of altering archaeological evidence
through unjustified reconstructions has thus been the issuing of an ad hoc
set of regulations giving the FAD more freedom than the Venice Charter
(ICOMOS's programmatic document drawn up in 1964 at the very moment
of the foundation of the council) in fact allows. Central to the concept of
"mimetic" restoration underlined in the Bangkok Charter is that common
people have a religious appreciation of archaeological remains which does
not correspond to that of art historians. As Nikom M usigakama, FAD’s
deputy  director-general, put it du ring  a sym posium  on the Sukhothai
experience held in 1987 at the end of the ten-year restoration project:
We tried to restore the head [of the Buddha images] in order to satisfy the local 
people. In fact, if the local people are not satisfied with the cultural heritage, they 
will destroy it. This is a fact in the communities here. We tried to make the local and 
intellectual people satisfied and ap-preciative. But if we serve only the local people, 
the intellectual people may not appreciate. So what happened is that until now . . . we 
have not done anything because we don't know how to decide. (Ishizawa et al. 1988:27)
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Nikom, perhaps unintentionally, subscribes to one of the points of 
the critique of Chapter 1. Cultural heritage, far from being an untouchable 
legacy of the past from which it derives its importance, is a construct which 
can be modified in order to enhance its present appreciation and social 
utility. It is not surprising, then, that "conservation" for the FAD can be 
extended as far as im proving the aspect of a m onum ent to make it look 
more "appropriate" to its context and function. This outlook explains the 
presence of the several replicas of the Buddha that today, against the 
precepts of m odern archaeology, populate the ruins of the historical parks of 
Sukhothai and A yutthaya, and that naturally horrify the critics of the 
FAD.35 Still, the FAD has a point in arguing that, since in Thailand popular 
appreciation of an archaeological site comes prim arily from the religious 
respect it commands, the restoration of the stupa of Sukhothai and, for 
instance, Borobodur -  the world's biggest Buddhist architectural complex 
located in central Java, in a predom inantly Islamic nation -  has to fit 
different local realities. At the same time, this comparison shows how the 
immediate political utility of a restored Sukhothai for the Thai state is, in 
terms of national pride and patronage of religion, hardly paralleled by what 
the Indonesian governm ent is gaining internally by the restoration of 
Borobodur.
35Amongst the FAD’s advocates of this approach to archaeological restoration, there could 
be some rem inded of the following locus from Inscription No. 2 (mid-fourtheen century), 
referring to the reign of King Lithai of Sukhothai: "[The men] paved the floor of the great 
Mahabihara with bricks; when it was finished and perfected they went [...] to search for old 
broken stone statues of the Buddha to worship, bringing them from as far away as two or three 
days' travel, to set them in the Mahabihara. At some places they found a neck or a body, at 
some places they found the hair or an arm which had fallen away ... at some places they 
found a shin or a leg, at some places they found a hand or a foot... They brought them there to 
piece together and repair with m ortar, to make them as beatiful and fine in form and 
appearance as if they had been created by Indra; they brought them there to mend and restore 
into large, fresh-looking, and exceedingly beautiful statues of the Buddha. They filled the 
M ahabihara with them, placing them in many rows and niches" (Prasert and Griswold 
1992:393). I thank Dr. Tony Diller for pointing out this passage, to me.
However, it would be rather naive to criticise the FAD for being solely 
responsible for the alteration of antiquities when that process is in fact 
inherent in the very practice of heritage conservation, which always means 
the preservation of a particular interpretation of the past. Certainly, the 
FAD cannot avoid blam e for learning nothing from its own errors, in
I 0  o f  i Ö
particular letting out on contract large-budget projects to inadequate firms 
and d isregard ing  the advice of local com m unities and academ ics.36 
Nevertheless, the fact that even local communities are now expressing their 
opinions about, and criticism of, the FAD’s work on m atters such as 
conservation of cultural artefacts, comes as the result of a stronger 
awareness of the importance of heritage that the FAD itself has considerably 
fostered in the last twenty years. Notwithstanding significant reservations, 
the FAD's decisive role in transform ing the preservation of cultural 
heritage into a major national issue should be acknowledged.
2.3 National Heritage and Its Opponents
As I have just indicated, the official approach to national heritage is 
not w ithout its critics. Since the 1970s, which saw the reformulation of state 
cultural policy, in particular that concerning the artistic patrim ony, some 
academics and intellectuals have been outspoken in their opposition. One 
pole of criticism is represented by the school of Local History (prazvatisat 
thongthin) which is bound up with the movement of Community Culture 
(watanatham chumchon) and with the NGOs operating in the countryside. 
The m agazine Muang boran is the school’s stronghold w ith regard to
36The most recent controversy has concerned the FAD's restoration of Chedi Luang in 
Chiangmai, a 10 million Baht project completed in 1992 which has stirred w idespread 
criticism. Alerted by this experience, the Chiangmai community has been able to stop another 
project concerning the restoration of Wat Singh (Suthon 1993).
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archaeology and art history. The other pole is represented by independent 
scholars who may or may not have appointm ents in universities, and voice 
their criticism from authoritative seats like the Siam Society, the direction 
of SPAFA or other international bodies. This section provides a sketch of 
both parties.
At the core of the Community Culture movement and its academic 
branch, the Local H istory school, there is the dream  of inverting the 
apparent state of things, that is, restoring the peasant class (and its heritage) 
to the centre of the political, economic, and cultural Thai universe (Chatthip 
1991). Inspired by populist and egalitarian feelings contrasting w ith the 
dom inant values of the nouveax riches urban class, this movement, which 
the expanding presence of the Non-Governm ental Organisations on the 
national scene is m aking more influential, can be defined w ith  an 
oxymoron as composed of "traditionalist progressives." The w ritings of 
Sulak Sivaraksa (e.g., 1980), the social critic charged with lese-majesty in 
1984, can be taken as examples of what the group pursues, though Sulak is 
not personally linked to any school. Typical complaints are: the destruction 
of the v illage/com m unity  {ban) culture as a result of the industrial 
developm ent started in the 1950s; the prevailing of the authoritarian  
(royalist) version of Buddhism against the (allegedly) democratic faith of 
Sukhothai; the obliteration of Siamese identity as a consequence of the 
imitation of Western culture and consumerism.
On these prem ises, the archaeologist Srisakara Vallibotham a -  
associate professor at Silpakorn University and editor of Muang Boran since 
its establishment in 1974 -  has criticised for two decades the FAD policy as 
responsible for the destruction of archaeological evidence in o rder to 
develop heritage sites into tourist attractions, and for depriving local
communities of significant parts of their culture and beliefs in the name of 
the "national" heritage. Srisakara's (1992) latest attem pt is to revolutionise 
the paradigm  of official historiography by affirm ing the agency and 
autonom y of the Buddhist communities of the Khorat Plateau at the time of 
Khmer suprem acy between the sixth and thirteenth centuries, well before 
Sukhothai's sovereignty. A similar argum ent is found in the book about 
the kingdom of Chenla by historian Dhida Saraya (1992), who puts forth the 
thesis of Isaan as an independent area of civilisation w ithin m ainland 
Southeast Asia.
The aim of the Local History school is to replace the dom inant 
narrative of the centralised kingdom-nation em bedded in the continuity 
Sukhothai-Ayutthaya-Bangkok with the theory of a multicentered network 
of polities which had constituted the prem odern kingdom of Siam.37 While 
the switch of focus from the kings to the people, that is, from the events of 
the histoire evenementielle to the societal structure underlying the longuee 
duree, is reminiscent of the major challenge to W estern historiography by 
the Annales school since the 1930s, the implicit intent is denying the 
historical (if not the political) validity of the Bangkok-dominated Thai state 
created by Chulalongkorn's administrative reforms in the late nineteenth 
century. As Chatthip (1991:133) argues, the emphasis on the agency of local 
comm unities, seen as antithetic and antagonistic to state and capitalism, 
bears an anarchistic character challenging the hegemony of the Bangkok- 
based political and economic elites. However, it bears also a strong anti­
modern, utopian bias whose implications lie outside the present discussion.
37The most informed review of the nominalistic question Siam vs. Thailand as a m irror of the 
confrontation between a m ultiethnic, pluralistic conception of the kingdom  versus an 
ethnically homogeneous and politically authoritarian model, is Preecha (1988).
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From the mere point of view of heritage management, Local History 
scholars seem to rest in a doubly contradictory position. On the one hand, 
the FAD is criticised for pursuing an unscrupulous heritage policy aimed at 
m arketing the artistic patrim ony to the foreign tourist's superficial quest for 
sightseeing; on the other hand, the rigid conservation ethic underlying this 
criticism does not belong at all to indigenous tradition but is, in fact, a 
W estern import. The discrepancy of this standpoint is magnified by the 
failure to recognise that Thai village culture itself, by placing importance on 
ancient sites only when they are considered to be imbued with magic power 
(.saksit), has been one factor of heritage dissipation. Of course, this remark 
does not dispute that the responsibility for the destruction of a significant 
part of archaeological remains lies in the decades of massive looting; but if 
looting is a crime instigated by knowledgeable collectors, its perpretators are 
mostly villagers, who unconsciously sell out art treasures for a few Baht (cf. 
Byrne 1993). Local H istory dem ands that the m anagem ent of heritage 
resources be entrusted to the local communities, in contrast to the FAD's 
policy of centralisation. Such an aim requires, first of all, education about 
the importance of cultural heritage, to prevent the perpetuation of practices 
like looting. And to this end, the FAD has been giving an im portant 
contribution.
At the other end of the spectrum to these intellectuals culturally and 
politically committed to villagers, we find, also engaged in the polemics 
against state heritage policy, cosmopolitan scholars, often W estern-educated, 
who articulate their criticism w ithout a clear suppporting ideology. Piriya 
Krairiksh, the incumbent president of the Siam Society, can well be regarded 
as exemplificative of this second group. In 1977, as the curator of a major 
exhibition at the Bangkok National Museum, Piriya challenged the official 
classification of Thai art originally outlined by Prince Damrong in 1926 -  a
classification reflecting the benchmarks of the nationalist narrative -  by 
arguing that art styles can be linked to historic periods only when historical 
sources are abundant and reliable, which was not the case with Thailand. 
Therefore he established a new classification based on the criteria of style 
and provenance w ith four headings: Mon, Khmer, Thai and the Peninsular 
styles (Piriya 1977).38 This replacement of historical periods with an ethnic 
categorisation uncovers, as Apinan (1992:2) points out, a dynamic concept of 
culture, according to which art styles "have lives of their own and cannot be 
made neatly congruent with the rise and fall of a monarch or an empire."
However, Piriya's most controversial exploit came a decade later 
when he questioned, followed by other Thai and Western scholars, whether 
King Ramkhamaeng had really been the author of Sukhothai Inscription 
No. 1, discovered by the future King Mongkut in 1833 during his years as a 
monk (Piriya 1986). This time the impact of his thesis was by no means 
confined to art historical circles because it involved, as Princess Galyani (the 
King's sister) wrote in the preface to the collection of essays published by the 
Siam Society, "the most im portant piece of evidence for the early history 
and development of the Thai nation" (Chamberlain 1991:ix). Scholars have, 
on the whole, disagreed with the thesis of the inscription's inauthenticity 
proposed by Piriya, who, on his part, has come to the conclusion that 
M ongkut himself was its author (Chamberlain: Chap.6).39 Still, the whole
38piriya can be easily identified as the unnamed target of Na Paknam’s strong criticism, in 
the introduction of his book on Thai art history (1985:2-3): "It is unfortunate for Thailand 
that some Thai scholars rely so much on Westerners in thinking and disregard themes that 
W esterners have not researched or documented. . . . Such an action on the Thai part is 
shameful. Furthermore these very Thai scholars were in the habit of accusing those with 
opposite view as blind nationalist. However, they have attracted a lot of followers and the 
Fine Arts Department which held a major arts exhibition at the National Museum had done 
away with significant arts periods. This is a manifestation of disgrace to Thailand's history. 
While scholars throughout the world have not confirmed that Dvaravati art belongs to the 
Mon race, Thai scholars have simply jumped to that conclusion."
debate is m uch m ore significant for the political rather than for the 
philological questions it has raised. In fact, if a distinguished art historian 
like Piriya can argue that the most im portant material evidence supporting 
the nationalist narrative is a fake, and this assertion does not provoke any 
overreaction from the m onarchy, w hat degree of self-confidence in its 
pervasiveness has that narrative achieved?
demonstration of the resonance of the Ramkhamaeng controversy beyond the academic 
circle is in the following passage from a recent government publication: "Much of what we 
know about Sukhothai in the 13th century derives from King Ram khamhaeng's stone 
inscription of 1292. The inscription is problematic, but it is considered to be a seminal source of 
Sukhothai history as well as a masterpiece of Thai literature . . . .  Even allowing for some 
hyperbole in King Ramkhamhaeng's inscription, it is probably true that Sukhothai was 
prosperous and well-governed." (National Identity Board 1991:12).
3. Consuming Heritage: The Tourist Dimension
In his pam phlet against the British "heritage industry," Robert 
H ew inson (1987:9) w rote, "Instead of m anufacturing  goods, we are 
m anufacturing heritage, a commodity which nobody seems able to define 
but which everybody is eager to sell" (original emphasis). W hether this is 
indeed the case, there are few problems in identifying the ideal consumer of 
such a com m odity in the tourist, "a tem porarily leisured person who 
voluntarily visits a place away from home for the purpose of experiencing a 
change" (Smith 1989:1).40 Indeed, m useum s such as Paris' Louvre or 
Florence's Uffizi attract some five million visitors per year, and m useum s 
are just one aspect of the appeal that historic cities and sites have as tourist 
attractions. With regard to holiday destinations where the focus is not on 
the material past, it is the chance of experiencing an exotic culture via its 
distinctive forms, from handicraft to religious ceremonies, which often 
prom pts the tourist's visit. It is revealing, in this regard, that even 
Thailand, whose popularity among holiday-goers is predom inantly due to 
its hedonistic appeal, is now prom oted as a destination for "cultural 
tourism," as if the word "culture" could thaumaturgically purge tourism  of 
its disturbing aspects by dignifying it.
40After this rather sensible definition, Smith (1989) adds a tourist typology made up of five 
different categories (ethnic, cultural, historical, environm ental, recreational) which are 
somewhat overlapping and incongruous. Wood's (1984) conceptual reformulation of Smith's 
categorisation focuses on ethnic and cultural tourism, the second differing from the first for 
the attention is more on artefacts than on the concrete cultural activities of people. Cohen's 
(1979) phenom enological typology includes "experiential," "experim ental," and 
"existential."
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In fact, tourism is, first and foremost, an inescapable business activity 
in which national governments often have more than a feeble interest; and 
the preservation of cultural (and natural) heritage can hardly be divorced 
from the necessity of their being m arketed as tourist attractions. So, 
whether or not tourism constitutes the biggest threat to the conservation of 
cultural resources, it is likely to affect the way a host society regards its 
heritage and, in the end, the very way it relates to this heritage. W hen 
m arketed as "authentic" and "traditional," artefacts and cultural practices, 
whose preservation and revival tourism may foster, prom ote perceptions 
and definitions of national and cultural identity.41 Therefore we could 
discover that, despite the stress which planners and critics place on 
in ternational tourism , cultural productions staged for the tou ris t -  
including heritage attractions -  influence perhaps more the domestic than 
the foreign spectator. Such a concern, rather than an evaluation of 
tourism 's impact on Thai heritage or its management as a tourist attraction, 
is the topic here.
3.1 The Context of Thai Tourism
Albeit the origins of an elite tourism in Thailand dates from the late 
1920s, and royal sponsorship of tourism can be said to have started even 
earlier w ith Chulalongkorn (Meyer 1988:61-63), the actual beginnings of
41 Two m ain theoretical formulations have dom inated the debate about "tradition" and 
"authenticity" in tourism  studies. M acCannel (1973;1976) initially argued that the 
commodification of cultural forms for tourist consumption destroys their original meaning 
which is therefore replaced by a "staged authenticity." Cohen redefined authenticity not as 
a given quality, but as a socially constructed concept and therefore "negotiable" on the basis of 
the guest's and host's own views. Moreover, since "commoditisation often hits a culture not 
when is flourishing, but when it is actually already in decline" (Cohen 1988:382), mass- 
tourism's demand for cultural products can be considered a powerful incentive to make local 
people again interested in vanishing aspects of their tradition. For an useful review of this 
debate, see Wood (1993).
mass tourism has been the result of the Sarit era's push for development in 
the late 1950s. The rapid growth of the service sector, particularly in 
Bangkok, was of great support to the burgeoning tourism  industry. 
Although there was no explicit underlying governm ent policy (Meyer 1988: 
67-68), 1959 was the year of the establishment of the Tourist Organisation of 
Thailand. In the same year the new air-line company, Thai Airways 
International (Thai), was created through a joint-venture with, and under 
the initial m anagem ent of, the Scandinavian A irline System. Sarit's 
obsession w ith the "cleanliness" (khwamsahat) of the facade of society as 
proof of an achieved standard of "civilization" (khzvampen araya prathet), 
and the extensive world tour of the Thai royal couple in the same period 
were also of great help in promoting the image of the kingdom abroad.
If the beginning of tourism  precedes the Vietnam War era, this 
period, however, left its lasting mark on it. The tourism  sector greatly 
benefited from the huge flow of American aid spent in the development of 
infrastructure, particularly roads. The presence of U.S. military bases in the 
northeastern provinces caused the m ushroom ing of hotels, restaurants, 
bars, nightclubs and massage parlours, and the same happened in Bangkok, 
destination  of the Am erican soldiers on their five days "Rest and 
Recreation" leave. During the second half of the 1960s, when the annual 
growth rate of revenue from tourism was about 27% (Bangornat 1982:7), the 
percentage of R&R visitors from the total tourist arrivals fluctuated between 
a m inim um  of 16% (1966), and a m axim um  of 23% (1968); and the 
percentage of their expenditure between 28% (1966) and 53% (1968) of the 
total tourist expenditure (Meyer 1988:73).
In the mid 1970s, in a regional climate of communist trium phs and 
rising Islamic fundam entalism , Thailand was virtually the most pleasant
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and safe country to visit in Southeast Asia. Thai guerrilla warfare was a 
rural phenom enon which never endangered safety in the cities. In the 
period 1973-76 the main target of demonstrations were Japanese economic 
interests, though one of the most memorable strikes in the social history of 
Thailand concerned the employment conditions at the Dusit Thani Hotel in 
Bangkok, at that time under American management (Meyer 1988:76-78). In 
the second half of the 1970s, in the m idst of an economic slowdown, 
tourism became a major source of foreign exchange earnings. In the Fourth 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1977-81) for the first time an entire 
section was devoted to tourism  developm ent, and in 1979 the Tourist 
O rganisation of Thailand was upgraded to the Tourist A uthority  of 
Thailand (TAT). Thereafter, the 1980s saw a spectacular growth of annual 
tourist arrivals, from the 2 million of the beginning of the decade to the 5 
million at the end, figures largely outclassing those of the neighbouring 
countries.42 Tourism revenue grew from the 17 million Baht of 1980 to the 
110 million of 1990, constituting since 1982 the biggest foreign exchange 
earner (Somchai 1992:8).43 Decisive factors for this huge increase in tourist 
arrivals have been the dramatic reduction of air-fares and the expansion of 
international air-links as a result of the "deregulation" policy. Bangkok, 
today a regional hub challenging Singapore's supremacy, is experienced by 
many travelers as an en-route stop-over between the Asian-Pacific region 
and the Middle East and Europe.
42In 1990 Malaysia received 7 million international visitors (almost 2 million more than 
Thailand) as a result of the Visit Malaysia Year promotion, though this figure includes the 
many day-tripping Singaporeans. In any case, 1990 Malaysia's estimated tourist receipts at 
US$ 1,520 million (US$ 47 per day) compare badly with the estimated US$ 4,400 million of 
Thailand (US$ 103 per day). Another notable difference is found in the 1989 share of tourist 
expenditure for shopping, which accounted for 16.7% in Malaysia and 36.9% in Thailand. 
Figures from the respective national tourist boards, in Walton (1993:224).
43Since tourism provides a source of foreign earnings, it is considered in economic terms as an 
export product. However, the impossibility of storing and exporting such a product, which is 
consumed at the time and in the place of its production, makes the tourism industry more 
similar to the services sector.
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Since the 1980s the generic formula of cultural heritage has became a 
keyw ord of tourist prom otion thanks to special events such as the 
Ratanakosin Bicentennial in 1982; the celebrations for the sixtieth birthday 
of King Bhumibol in 1987, coupled w ith the prom otion of the Visit 
Thailand Year;44 and the ceremonies for the longest reign of Thai history 
held in 1988, followed by the Thailand Arts and Crafts Year. The second half 
of the 1980s saw also a major change in governm ent interventions in 
tourism. Under the sixth plan (1987-91) budget allocations have started to be 
m ade directly to the TAT in order to develop both short- and long-term 
plans w ith a w ide ranging brief, from m onum ent restoration to road 
construction. Today the TAT maintains thirteen regional offices within the 
country and as many overseas to promote Thailand in Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe and North America.
Yet steps to repackage Thailand as a more presentable tourist 
destination have hardly succeeded in m itigating the reputation of the 
country as the most notorious recipient of sex tours in Asia (Ritcher 1989). 
International tourist arrivals, still showing a high male ratio, have been 
dom inated since the 1970s by visitors from Asia, whose share was nearly 
half of the total arrivals of the decade and increased further in the 1980s. 
Asians are followed (1989) by tourists from West Europe (15%, referring to 
four countries only), USA (5.5%), Australia (4.5%). In Asia, ASEAN 
countries constitute the main tourist-generating region (23.5%) w ith 
Malaysia and Singapore as the dominant sources; Japan follows (11.5%); the
44The 1987 Visit Thailand Year has been the model for the subsequent 1990 Visit Malaysia 
Year, 1991 Visit Indonesia Year, and 1992 Visit ASEAN Year.
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NICs: Taiwan, Hongkong, Korea (18.5%); India (2.5%); other countries, 
particularly in the Middle East, account for the remaining 19%.45
In 1991-92 a decrease in tourist arrivals was recorded for the first time 
since 1976: the concurrence of the w orld recession, the Gulf War, the 
February 1991 coup, and mainly the May 1992 crisis broke the dream  of 
indefinite growth. Besides, the deterioration of local resources is pushing 
the Thai tourism industry to look for new markets to exploit, such as Burma 
and Indochina, an option acknowledged by the same TAT (a tourism  
agreement with Laos was signed in 1992) and by many Thai investors who 
are ex tending  their business in the region (TAT n.d.*). Indeed, 
environm ental issues have become in Thailand a pressing concern, but 
despite steps such as the 1992 Environm ental Act, the incapacity of 
provincial governmental bodies to enforce the legislation against polluters 
and illegal builders in big tourist resorts like Phuket Island and Pattaya is 
evident. In Bangkok the dramatic levels of air pollution and traffic jams are 
already inducing tourists to shorten their stay or even skip the capital. 
Thus, "culture and nature" (watanathammachat), the TAT's prom otional 
catch-phrase for the early 1990s, sounded like unintentional sarcasm or an 
exorcism for a future that poses serious questions about the sustainability of 
tourism growth (Parnwell 1993).
This outline would be incomplete without considering the domestic 
dimension of tourism, but because of the lack of statistics these comments 
are merely descriptive (an isolated figure for 1987 shows a num ber of 8.7
^R ounded  off precentages calculated on 1989 figures, in Walton (1993:226). It is useful to 
remind that until 1979 international tourist arrivals were registered after citizenship, and 
not according to the country of residence. This fact led, for example, to greatly overstimate 
the number of British visitors, many of who were, in fact, Hongkong Chinese. Record of the 
tourist's country of residence is taken since 1980 (Meyer 1988:79).
million domestic tourists). The Thais are considered to be people inclined 
to internal mobility, and this is particularly true at the time of feast-days and 
festivals. The religious function of making a pilgrim age to a Buddhist 
shrine in order to acquire merit (tham bun) has been always coupled with 
the hedonistic aspects of a journey (pay thiao). Indeed, pilgrim age as a 
motive for travelling is found in every society and epoch. Nevertheless, 
since merit-seeking travellers used to stay at relatives' and friends' places or 
in cheap guest-houses, this form of domestic tourism  has been for a long 
time overlooked by the TAT as a negligible source of income, as well as not 
affecting the demand for international-standard infrastructures.
If this argument was correct in the past, it could hardly be valid any 
more. The growth during the last decade of an affluent urban  strata, 
particularly in Bangkok, has naturally increased the num ber of people 
traveling for pleasure. While traditional destinations and m eans of 
transport like trains and buses are still very popular ,46 the well-off desire to 
experience the status of tourist as a privileged category typical of m odern 
and developed countries. Thus, for instance, Bangkokians now spend their 
week-ends at beach resorts like Pattaya and Huahin, the royal resort where 
the Victorian-style Railway Hotel has been recently refurbished as one of 
Thailand's top hotels .47 Or they go to visit what Central Thais regard as the 
"exotic" region of the country, Isan, where the recently restored Khmer 
temples have become a big attraction. The TAT itself is trying to meet its 
past shortcomings; in planning events, it devotes much space to local fairs 
and festivals which essentially appeal to domestic tourists (TAT n.d.**).
46For instance, second and third class seats on the afternoon Bangkok-Chiangmai train during 
Songkran festivities are booked out weeks in advance.
47It should be noted that recent Western appreciation for the tanned body generally goes 
against the aesthetic ideals of Asians, who appreciate fair skin. Accordingly, the ritual of 
sun-bathing does not attract Thai people, not even at beach resorts.
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Some inferences can be put forward at this point before proceeding 
further. First, it is clear that the transform ation of Thailand into a major 
tourist destination since the 1960s has been due to structural and political 
factors which had m ade its degree of developm ent and stability, both 
essential to the tourism industry, without equal in the context of the region 
thirty years ago. The sole cultural factor that can somehow be considered 
conducive to tourism is the Buddhist religion, because its non-conflictual 
attitude tow ards believers of other faiths is not a barrier, either real or 
psychological, betw een hosts and guests, as is Islam in neighbouring 
c o u n tr ie s .48 M oreover, Buddhist iconography has long appealed to 
W esterners, youth above all. Second, it is comm on know ledge that 
Thailand's popularity  as tourist destination has m uch to do w ith the 
tourism of the three-S (sand, sun and sex), and this despite the fact that, with 
Pagan and Angkor out of reach, Thailand's monumental heritage has been 
for decades the only easily accessible in m ainland Southeast Asia. The 
recent stress on culture in tourist prom otion appears to have been also a 
way to overcome the notoriety of the country as a sex heaven, which the 
pressure of churches, social organisations, concerned individuals, and 
eventually AIDS has transformed in the 1980s from a major attraction into 
an em barrassing burden. Third, though farang remain curiously more 
visible to the eyes of Thai, and even Western, critics of tourism, they are 
only a relative minority; Asians constitute today the bulk of international 
arrivals, and recreational facilities such as the spreading golf courses clearly 
reflect the propensities of these tourists, as well those of the local elite.49
48Thus Wood (1984:365): "It is striking, for example, how unmarketable Islam seems to be in 
Indonesia and Malaysia." Islamic moral regulations are indeed perceived as limiting tourism 
developm ent in these countries, where a "double-standard" morality is applied to tourist 
resorts and facilities. Further, people such as Israeli citizens are prevented from visiting 
Islamic countries.
Finally, it has to be taken into account that the expanding local middle-class 
has become in recent years one important source of holiday-goers and that, 
in visiting up-country areas, this class adopts a "tourist" attitude which 
underlines its own divergence, in terms of status, habits, culture, from 
provincial people .50 Domestic tourists from a m odern urban context can be 
no less keen than foreigners in their longing for the "quaint," and are 
certainly more receptive than them to stagings such as festivals and national 
celebrations which exploit the folk patrim ony and the repertoire of 
traditional symbols.
3.2 Thai Heritage as a Tourist Attraction
Cultural heritage, quite loose a term in any case, becomes despairingly 
vague when placed in the context of tourism. In this thesis the focus is on 
the built heritage, i.e., historic sites and cities, ancient m onum ents and 
m useum s which are popular tourist attractions in Europe and N orth 
America. I have just questioned, on generic premises, whether the same 
holds for Thailand when we refer to the mass of foreign visitors. Now, in 
order to trace a satisfying picture of the local "cultural tourism," I will 
discuss both statistical and impressionistic data concerning the response of 
foreign and domestic tourists to heritage attractions. An evaluation of the 
TAT's marketing strategy for heritage is also among the aims of this section,
^Indeed , it would be interesting to study why the stereotype of the ugly American (tourist) is 
so persistant, even in the face of a change in tourist trends in Southeast Asia which is by now 
an accomplished reality.
50Particularly in multiethnic Southeast Asian countries (but also in Australia or the USA 
where the indigenous populations have outlived Western colonisation), exoticism can be 
experienced "at home." For the case of Javanese elite tourists looking for exoticism in Tana 
Toraja see Volkman (1990).
while the role of this agency in shaping, through tourist promotion, the 
globally perceived image of Thailand will be discussed in the next section.
To begin with, some illuminating inferences can be drawn from the 
statistics of the Annual Report of the National Museums Division (1991:33- 
34). In 1991, from a total of 5,086,899 foreign tourists, only 289,928 (that is, 
about 6%) visited a national museum. This figure compares with 579,749 
paying Thai adults, to which should be added 382,968 students and 57,668 
monks, all of whom enter free, to obtain a total of 1,020,385 national 
visitors.51 The Royal Barges Museum, a stopping point of boat tours along 
the Chaophraya, was the museum most patronised by foreigners: 90,120 
international visitors out of a total of 100,687. However, only 58,518 
foreigners (less than 1.2% of tourist arrivals!) visited the Bangkok National 
Museum, probably the richest art collection in Southeast Asia, which has an 
admittance-fee of a mere 20 Baht and offers weekly guided tours in six 
foreign languages.52 The museum is just a few metres from the certainly 
more spectacular Grand Palace-Wat Phra Keo, arguably the most popular 
heritage attraction in the country, for Thais and foreigners alike.53 It is clear 
that this proximity does not help because few are bold enough to couple the 
visit to the Grand Palace with one to the museum. In any case, the Bangkok 
National Museum, with a grand total of 210,573 patrons, rated in 1991 only
52
51 The 1991 grand total of 1,339,409 visitors includes also 29,096 official guests.
52The six languages are: Chinese, English, French, German, Spanish and Portuguese. Besides, 
the TAT Bangkok brochure lists the National Museum as the fourth main city attraction, 
after the Grand Palace-Wat Phra Keo, the annexed Coins Pavillion, and the recently 
restored Vimanmek Palace, which can be all visited with the 100 Baht admission-ticket (for 
non-Thai visitors) to the Grand Palace.
53I have been unable to collect the attendance figures to the Grand Palace. Still, that 
Bangkok's royal complex is the country's most visited monument seems to me a reasonable 
assumption.
as the second most visited among the national museums after that in Phra 
Nakhonkhiri, in Petchaburi province.
The m useum  at Phra N akhonkhiri is part of the historical park 
established in the area of the summer palace built by King Rama IV on the 
top of a hill. There were 259,367 Thai paying adults, ten times more than 
foreigners, out of a total of 310,334 patrons. The impressive popularity of 
this site with Thais could have something to do w ith its close association 
with King Mongkut, and perhaps with its proximity to the capital which 
allows one-day trips. A rather different distribution of visitors is found at 
ancient Sukhothai. There, the Ram kham haeng M useum  had 66,232 
patrons, of which 38,026 were foreigners; of the Thais only 10,203 were 
adults, while 13,702 were students and monks, and 4,301 were official guests 
(more than for any other m useum , which clearly proves the role of 
Sukhothai as a showcase for national heritage). The m useum 's ratio 
roughly reflects that for the Historical Park, where foreigners account for 
almost half the attendance (they were 207,870 out of the total of 433,476 
patrons in 1989). The decennial creation of the Park has required a 
considerable financial investment, justified not only in terms of national 
pride, but also of economic return. The prom otional em phasis on 
Sukhothai, added to its World Heritage status, can certainly be taken as one 
reason for its success with foreigners.
However, apart from this exception, other important heritage sites do 
not attract many foreign tourists: this is manifest from the 1991 figures for 
Phimai Historical Park, an impressive Khmer temple in the Northeast, and 
for the m useum  at the famous prehistoric site of Ban Chiang. The 
Historical Park of Phimai had 181,866 Thai and 26,491 foreign patrons;54 at
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Ban Chiang, out of a total of 45,408 visitors, 29,283 were Thai paying adults 
and only 5,162 were foreigners, that is, 0.1% of that year's tourist arrivals.55
Although it is not a piece of national heritage properly speaking, a 
historic site which is extremely popular with W estern tourists is the River 
Kwai (Khwee) Bridge in Kanchanaburi, just 130 km. northwest of Bangkok. 
Memories and images of the "Death Railway," perhaps boosted by David 
Lean's film The Bridge Over the River Kwai, are arguably the strongest 
reasons to visit this place. The bridge, however, shows how a heritage site 
that is testimony of a tragic past can be transformed into a kind of fun park 
mini-rail, or just a picturesque element of the landscape. W ithout doubt, 
interpreting heritage in the case of the River Kwai Bridge w ould be a 
controversial operation, touching on questions such as the war atrocities 
perpetrated by present-day Thailand's major investor, Japan; Thailand's 
publicly forgotten role as Japan's ally in Asia; and the bridge's value as an 
icon of the Allies' antifascist war, but in whose construction almost nine- 
tenth of the victims were in fact Asian prisoners. Thus, between the "cold" 
and the "hot" interpretation of historical sites (Uzzell 1989), the TAT has 
opted for jocular: a week-long festival at the end of November with "rides
54Figures collected in situ, January 1993.
55Student attendance figures at national museums deserve a separate comment since they 
show a rather different perspective, which, however, arguably reflects teachers' choice 
rather than those of students who are counted in the statistics. The most visited was the 
Bangkok National Museum, next to Thammasat and Sinlapakorn Universities, followed by 
the Chao Samphraya in Ayutthaya, where students (many of whom flowing from the 
capital) accounted for 60% of the attendance. Surprisingly, in third and fourth places we find 
the museums of the two southern provincial capitals of Songkhla and Nakhon Si Thammarat; 
from this datum we can infer that the two museums, where the heritage on display is not so 
much "Thai" but that of the Hinduised states of the Malay Peninsula, are the main recipients 
of school-groups within the south of Thailand. Yet the highest number of student patrons in 
1991 did not belong to any national museum, but to the innovative permanent exhibition of the 
Ayutthaya Historical Study Center.
on vintage trains" (TAT n.d.**:23), and whose hallm ark is a son et lumiere 
presentation simulating an air attack.56
The possibility of making sense of a visit to the River Kwai Bridge 
comes from two other places in Kanchanaburi city: the war cemetery, with 
the graves of 6,982 Allied prisoners of war (POW); and the JEATH war 
museum, whose acronym stands for Japan, England, America and Australia, 
Thailand, H olland. This is a private m useum  (20 Baht adm ission) 
established in 1977 by the abbot of the nearby Wat Chaichumpol and run by 
the local monks: it exhibits a collection of POW photographs and personal 
objects in a bamboo hut built in the manner of those of the prison-camps. 
Visiting this small and honest m useum is a disturbing experience, of the 
kind few tourists associate with the idea of a holiday in Thailand. This is, 
perhaps, why many prefer to end their visit further up, at the bridge.
From these statistics and observations the hardly surprising result 
emerges that only a few of the million foreigners who every year visit 
Thailand have any interest in the local heritage; and even then, this interest 
is mainly confined to landmarks such as the Grand Palace-Wat Phra Keo 
and, outside Bangkok, the Sukhothai Historical Park. This datum  appears 
both in line w ith Thailand's established image as a destination for a 
recreational holiday, and with the local tourism industry 's main market, 
that of the package-tours made of large tourist groups with their pre-selected 
itineraries.57 But even in the case of individual and "alternative" travellers,
56This is how the site is presented in the TAT Kanchanaburi brochure: "The bridge over the 
River Kwai is internationally famous, thanks to several popular motion pictures and books. 
The black iron bridge was brought from Java by the Japanese Army and reassembled under 
Japanese supervision [!] by Allied prisoner-of-war labour as part of the 'Death Railway' 
linking Thailand and Myanmar. Still in use today, the bridge was the target of frequent 
Allied bombing raids during 1945, and was rebuilt after the war ended. The curved spans of 
the bridge are the original sections. The bridge . . .  is the focal point of a riverside area of 
restaurants, souvenir, handicraft and jeweller shops."
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who generally stay for longer periods and arrange their own journeys, the 
focus of interest is not so much on historical or archeological sites but on 
living cu ltu res, i.e., the northern  ethnic m inorities settled  around  
C hiangm ai (see Meyer 1988: Chap. 8; Cohen 1989).58 Hence, despite 
differences in attitude and motivations held by international tourists, I shall 
argue that, allowing for exceptions to the rule, their experience of ubiquitous 
cultural heritage has basically two dimensions.
The first dimension is the particular setting of the holiday, which in 
Thailand owes much to the gilded Buddhist architecture, "exotic" not only 
to W esterners but also to the preponderant Malaysian and Singaporean 
visitors. Temples impress tourist perception of the built environment with 
a uniquely Thai "colour." The second dimension is that of handicraft 
souvenirs which nurture (with photos) later recollections of the trip .59 
Because of the focus of this thesis on the built heritage, I will refrain from 
discussing the topic of handicraft and "tourist art."60 I just wish to point
57Package tours have their own peculiar destinations such as Mini Siam, a display of 
miniaturised reproductions of famous architectures in the vicinity of Pattaya, which attracts 
a huge num ber of groups from Singapore, Hongkong, Taiwan. Only a few patrons are Thai, 
who arrive in family groups; Westerners seem to have not interest in it (the only ones I met 
during my visit in December 1992, were a British teacher and his child, who were travelling 
with a Hongkong group). Much more popular both with Thais and farang is the nearby Nong 
Nooch Village where elephant and a "cultural" shows, featuring scenes of Siamese and 
Northern Tribal life, are staged twice a day.
58That the popularity of Chiangmai, the second most visited destination after Bangkok, does 
not rest on cultural appeal strictu sensu is shown by the attendance figures at Chiangmai 
National Museum: just 26,034 visitors in 1991, of which only 7,690 were foreigners (Nat. 
M useums Div. 1991:34). It is nevertheless true that, despite the evident commercialisation, 
Thai people still have a strong religious motivation for visiting Chiangmai temples, in 
particular the hill sanctuary of Doi Suthep.
59It is im portant to recognise that the tourist journey is actually made up of five distinct 
stages: anticipation; travel to the destination; on-site behaviour; return travel; recollection 
(Jackson 1989). A particularly emotional recollection stage can be the reason for a second trip 
to the destination.
60Handicraft is variously presented in many case-studies as the aspect of cultural heritage 
which more clearly typifies the process of cultural commodification implied in the encounter 
between hosts and guests. As basic references, besides those given in footnote 41, see Graburn 
(1976; 1984); Cohen (1993).
out, en passant, what appears to me as a basic difference: on the one hand, 
handicraft can, as the product of a "tradition," connote identities, whether 
ethnic or national; on the other hand, the capacity of the built heritage -  
"the visible past" -  for evoking historical m emories is not m atched by 
handicraft, because of its dom inant practical-decorative function. It is of 
course remarkable that 36.9% of tourist expenditure in Thailand in 1989 was 
for shopping, against the 16.7% of Malaysia and 18.6% of Indonesia (ASEAN 
Industry  Report 1990, in W alton 1993:224). This figure may suggest 
som ething about the appeal and variety of Thai handicrafts though 
concealing the actual tourist choices in a market spanning from industrially 
or m ass-produced items to objects of art m ade according to traditional 
craftsm anship, which include also antiques, w hether authentic or fake, 
often illegally sold.
If the above data can be explained by the different preferences of 
foreign and domestic tourists, it is also possible to see this gap, at least in 
part, as a result of the way heritage is promoted to tourists. The impression 
is that those perhaps least persuaded of heritage's viability as a tourist 
attraction are within the TAT itself. TAT's marketing strategy of presenting 
festivals at heritage sites in order to provide them with some appeal, rather 
than making the most of their artistic and historical value, clearly stems 
from an idea of monuments and ruins as intrinsically uninteresting. The 
focus is thus on having fun (sanuk ) while ruins are relatively in the 
background, as a sort of second-rate attraction. This is a strategy hardly 
effective with foreign visitors: in fact, the few who are culturally motivated 
are attracted by the m onuments per se rather than by the attached fairs, 
while fairs are not a stimulus for all of those who look suspiciously at 
everything "cultural." Quite the contrary is true with regard to local 
excursionists, who, in their selection from a number of leisure options, may
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regard festivals as inducements to visit an ancient m onum ent rather than 
some other place.
Amongst the seventy-nine tourist events staged in 1992, sixty-five had 
a folk, religious or historical background (TAT n.d.**). These stagings are 
held at several heritage locations, like Phetchaburi, Phitsanulok, Lampang, 
Phanom Ruang, Phimai, Kamphaeng Phet, Ayutthaya and many others; but 
the most famous is the three-day Loi Krathong festival celebrated in 
Novem ber am idst the remains of Sukhothai, and during which a son et 
lumiere show with perform ers in traditional costumes is staged at Wat 
M ahathat on the full-moon night. This extremely popular event has been 
presented since its first staging in the early 1980s as a genuine tradition from 
the time of Sukhothai, and its attendance by Princess Sirindhorn in 1987, the 
year of the completion of the Park's restoration, was surely a sort of royal 
recognition of this Broadway-like historical reenactm ent.61 Srisakara 
Vallibhotama, a fierce critic of the Sukhothai Historical Park, has claimed 
that besides the im proper restoration of archaeological sites for tourism  
exploitation, "historical legends were written . . . which are entirely against 
the history, e.g., the Loy Krathong Festival at the ancient city of Sukhothai" 
(Srisaka 1992:22). Still, this festival is largely a national attraction, as is 
proven by the fact that it substantially increases only Thai attendance of the 
Park, at its peak in November.
61 In this regard, it is timely to recall the persisting ban in Thailand on the genuine Broadway 
production of The King and I (the musical and the film), based on the memories of the English 
Mrs. Anna Leonowens, tutor of the royal children at the court of King Rama IV. Despite the 
ban, Queen Sirikit attended the show during a tour in the USA in 1985, and met the actor Yul 
Brynner who played, both on stage and on the screen, the role of Mongkut, winning for his 
interpretation the 1956 Oscar as best male actor. Indeed the ban appears extremely unfair if 
we consider how much both film and musical have contributed to the romancing of "The Land 
of Smiles."
In conclusion it is perhaps useful to stress that heritage sightseeing in 
Thailand involves m ainly dom estic spectators in an ever-increasing 
number thanks to rising standards of living and education. Of course, this is 
not a to tally  recent phenom enon; heritage  has been trad itiona lly  
experienced via pilgrim ages to religiously significant m onum ents and 
school excursions, which continue to be part of the social life of a majority of 
the Thai population. The historical sites restored in the last decade and the 
new m useum s established have added to an already existing patrim ony, 
logically becoming attractions for the educated middle-class which can afford 
travelling for leisure. While I will not repeat here my earlier argum ents 
objecting to the com m on tenets about cu ltu ra l heritage , clearly 
representations of the past offered by various heritage attractions -  
m useum s, historical parks, local festivals and mises en scene -  may 
constitute an influential source from which the Thai community derives its 
historical imaginary.
Besides the datum  concerning dom estic tourism , it is how ever 
evident that, despite the recent emphasis on culture and traditions in tourist 
promotion, Thailand is still predom inantly experienced by foreign visitors 
as a typical escapist holiday destination with little or no attention at all paid 
to local culture, with the exception of the scenographic function of temples 
and street rituals, and handicraft souvenirs. I have already hinted at a sort 
of unwillingness by the TAT to really challenge the notorious character of 
Thai tourism, whether because of actual distrust about the appeal of heritage 
to international tourists or because of Thai scepticism about foreigners' 
capacity for understanding their culture. This argument is developed in the 
next section, which looks at the marketed depiction of Thailand as "The
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Land of Smiles," and questions the extent to which this cliche of the exotic 
country par excellence (Urry 1990:108)62 is, in fact, perceived as real.
3.3 Promotional Narrative and "Tourist Heritage"
Nowadays, a holiday abroad starts well before arriving physically in 
situ. Its very beginning is in its anticipation at home, when the destination 
is selected and initially experienced by gazing at the deluge of images of 
brochures, tour operators' catalogues, travel and geographical magazines, 
sometimes w ith accompanying videocassetes. This im pressive flood of 
visual messages is correctly said to create expectations and stereotypes that 
the actual journey is often supposed to confirm and consolidate.63 In the 
jargon of tourism  analysis it is said that tourists select their holiday 
destination on the basis that its naive image (the image formed through the 
mass of information) exceeds their evaluative image (the aspiration level) 
by the greatest am ount (Ashworth and Goodall 1988:232). This formula 
m aintains the marketing of the image of destination countries as crucial in 
the process of holiday selection. Information adding up to the destination's 
naive image is generated from two kinds of sources: informal, such as
62About Bali, Vickers (1989:2) writes that "more than any other tropical island Bali has 
become the most exotic of exotic locations, a fantasy of all the splendors of the Orient and the 
beauties of the Pacific." Yet Bali's fame is not at all extended to the whole archipelago 
constituting the Indonesian nation-state. Indeed some visitors have problems in locating Bali 
as part of Indonesia (Wood 1984:365). By contrast, it shows up the national character of 
"Exotic Thailand." .
63Michael Friedel (1993:64), a professional photographer, ironically describes the osmosis 
linking "Homo touristicus" to "his inanimate prostheses and necessary accessories -  his 
camera equipment, his mini-buses and a tourism infrastructure developed to ensure harmony 
between the photographers and the photographed." Friedel can easily satirise the fact that 
"Homo touristicus never goes anywhere to learn anything. He goes to verify what his friends 
have told him, or to impress them with new, bigger and better locations, from which he can 
bring back more exotic images." Still, professional photographers like Friedel are the very 
progenitor of "Homo touristicus," the creators of those images which induce the mass 
followers to travel and emulate their models.
friends, the tourist's past experience, etc.; and formal, i.e., the media in 
general and prom otional materials in particular. In his analysis of tourist 
operator brochures, Selwyn (1993:123-125) shows the dom inance of four 
motifs: natural and built sites, with a range of suggestions from the mystical 
to the raucous; beaches and boundaries, which dem arcate the tourist's 
territory; smiles of local people, generally children, who form the hum an 
landscape (friendly by definition) of a holiday; m agnificent food, a 
hedonistic  elem ent that I personally  read as a m etaphor for the 
appropriation (also sexual) of the exotic Other.
Of course, this inclination to shape, to exoticise, the ethnic and 
cultural Other is by no means a novelty. The Orient in particular is now 
ack n o w led g ed  as the typ ical exam ple of W estern  im p eria lis t 
conceptualisation of the Other, after Said's (1978) controversial study. Since 
its invention, photography has played a major role in creating and 
popularising  im ages of exoticism, and the contem porary m ass-m edia 
diffusion has just magnified this trend. The main difference with the past is 
that today it is the Other which creates and markets the images of its own 
"otherness." The wording and images of brochures of state agencies like the 
Tourist A uthority  of Thailand, the M alaysian Tourist D evelopm ent 
Corporation, the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board (duplicated in the 
advertisem ents of the national air-carriers) are statements made by these 
boards on behalf of their respective governments. Whether the given brand 
is "Exotic Thailand," "Fascinating Malaysia," or "Surprising Singapore," the 
aim of national tourist boards is not to sell holiday packages, like tourist 
operators do, but to highlight the destination's attractions and, above all, to 
present a high profile of the country. This marketed image is a construct 
reflecting official viewpoints that make the promotional literature of such
tourist boards nothing but a variation on the them e of the nationalist 
narra tive .64 So, for example, in a TAT brochure (in English) we can read:
Giving a unique character to the land and people is a quintessential quality of 
"Thainess" which stems from a strong adherence to traditions that have evolved over 
more than 700 years of independent development. . . .  At the same time, Thailand is a 
m odem  dynamic nation, firmly planted in the 20th century and eyeing to the 21st with 
confidence. Throughout the land there is thus a remarkable blend of the old and the 
new. This m eans that while the cultural heritage has been preserved to an 
extraordinary degree, the visitor can also appreciate the comfort and convenience 
provided by the most up-to-date facilities. (TAT n.d.***:2-3)
In this excerpt, echoing of motifs of state propaganda are manifest, 
and indeed the same statement could have been found in one of the several 
publications edited by the National Identity Board or the National Culture 
Commission. The message, peculiar to a romantic way of looking at the 
Orient, is that of a culture where dichotomous elements coexist smoothly 
ra ther than  causing conflict: developm ent is said to be have been 
"independent" (a hint to the lack of colonisation in the country's past); 
modernisation is assumed as a goal already achieved which has spared deep- 
rooted institutions such as the monarchy and Buddhism, still honoured and 
valued as pillars of society (in contrast to what modernisation brought about 
in the Western world); and cultural heritage has been, of course, preserved 
"to an extraordinary degree," despite the fact that till very recently private 
collectors could buy in Thailand all kinds of antiques. The TAT, often 
criticised for its modest contribution to tourism planning, has been highly 
successful in m arketing Thailand as "The Land of Smiles" through a 
volum inous literature, and perhaps thanks also to the very photogenic
64Selwyn (1993:123) tells about the brochure of a British tour operator that describes Thai 
people ". . . all as Peter Pans, eternal children who have never grown up." No such a 
statement could ever be found in TAT brochures, where, however, the Thai passion for sanuk 
is said, with a remarkable boldness, to have been documented in the first evidence of Thai 
writing, the famous Ramkhamhaeng's inscription: "All Thai festivals are characterized by a 
strong sense of sanuk. This has been true since the very earliest days of the nation. A famous 
stone inscription, dating from 1292, describes how the people of Sukhothai, the first Thai 
capital, went on merit-making. . . . There, seven centuries ago, can be seen the same elements 
present in nearly all contemporary festivals and public events . . . "  (TAT n.d.**:l)
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character of the country and its people, "an archetypal presentational 
society," as defined by Mulder (1992:159). Indeed, this image of "The Land of 
Smiles" would appear to have crossed the limits of tourism  prom otion to 
become, in the eyes of many, the very nature of Thailand (cf. National 
Geographic 1982,162:4).
N evertheless, how m uch state prom otion affects the tourist's  
eventual choice is open to question. Reviewing earlier researches, 
Ashworth and Goodall conclude that the official "supply" image projected 
by the destination country's tourist board is rarely the most decisive source 
of information about it. Media reports, the tourist's personal experience, 
and second-hand experiences gathered from acquaintances, are more 
effective than promotional literature in shaping the destination country's 
naive image held by the potential visitor. The possible mismatch between 
the supply and the naive images detracts from a destination country's ability 
to realise its tourism development potential (Ashworth and Goodall 1988: 
222; 231). Indeed, tourist boards often try hard to counteract the negative 
image generated by other sources; this seems just the case with Thailand, 
whose sex and drug trades have often had wide coverage in the media and, 
w ithout doubts, in travellers' tales. Instead figures suggest that this 
"vicious" image has for a long time favoured, rather than discouraged, 
tourism. It is a significant datum  that in 1985, when sex tourism was still 
very attractive, up to 57% of the total foreign tourists were on their second 
visit (Meyer 1988:256).
In other words, the well-known racy reality of Thai tourism does not 
detract from the enchantment of "The Land of Smiles." Rather, it gives it 
character: Bangkok's infamous Patpong Road -  with its succession of go-go 
bars and peep shows, now also filled with a night bazaar -  is innocently
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gazed upon by many tourists, even in family groups, as a "typical landscape" 
of the city, an "authentic" Bangkok sight, according to tourist mythology. 
The TAT has apparently been trying hard for some years to erase such an 
unpleasant public image (the image only, though), but the fact is that this 
image is something that the majority of foreigners identify with the fabled 
"Land of Smiles," and a pragmatic, not moralistic, approach to this question 
has to acknowledge that. To put it bluntly, and somehow sarcastically, 
Patpong is a sort of "heritage site," the legacy of decades of a certain Thai 
tourism that has come to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as its very essence. 
The serious question is that behind the carnivalesque facade there exists the 
reality of violence and the exploitation of women.
3.4 Heritage and Tourism, the National and the Global
In a perceptive article written a decade ago about the state's growing 
involvement in the process of cultural change in Southeast Asia as a result 
of tourism development, Robert Wood (1984:366-368) argued:
There is reason to believe that state definitions of tourist attractions, embodied in 
tourism  planning, m arketing and development, affect local perceptions of national 
identity and cultural heritage. . . . These state choices are also often embodied in state- 
sponsored cultural productions officially put together for international tourists but 
which become part of local elite culture as well. Several Southeast Asian countries 
have constructed large tourist parks outside their capital cities purporting to provide 
an overview of their cultural diversity and heritage. . . . While tourism thus involves 
the state in interpreting the past through new means, it also introduces what may be 
the quintessential symbol of modernity: the "international-standard" hotel. . . . State 
tourism  policy thus not only affects the definition of the "traditional," but the 
definition of the "modern" as well.
Developments in the last ten years, during which Southeast Asia has had 
one of the fastest growing tourism industries in the world, have on the 
whole confirmed W ood's observations. By way of conclusion to this 
chapter I will gloss them, focussing on how, in this short time-span, the 
terms of the dialectics between the "traditional" (heritage, authenticity,
national cultures) and the "modern" (globalisation, "staged authenticity," 
world culture) have changed within the Southeast Asian, and specifically 
the Thai, context.
The first remark is that today the sight of m odernity in Southeast 
Asia is, at least in the cities, by no means lim ited to the international- 
standard hotels, but includes much of what is around them; by contrast, the 
nostalgic flavour of the past has been recreated precisely in hotels. The case 
of Singapore is very representative in this regard. The most visited country 
in the region and Thailand's direct competitor, Singapore has based its 
unique "character" and popularity (not only with tourists but also in terms 
of in te rnal consensus) on its m odern  ou tlook , its technological 
advancement, and its material wealth. Nevertheless, the massive clearance 
of old quarters in the 1970s was subsequently regretted for having deprived 
the city-state of a large part of its colonial and ethnic architecture and, with 
it, of a characteristic element, one much valued by tourists. Consequently, 
the refurbishment of the colonial Raffles Hotel has been marketed not as a 
matter of private economic enterprise, but as the recovering of a major asset 
of Singapore's heritage. Bangkok's equivalent, The O riental Hotel, 
frequently rated as the best hotel in the world, can be seen in much the same 
perspective.65
65The first hotel's structure was built by two Danish sea captains in 1876. In 1886 Captain H. 
N. Anderson, founder of the East Asiatic Company (whose building still lies next to the 
Oriental), tore down the existing structure and employed an Italian architect to design a new 
building, today designated as the Authors' Residence, and the very highlight of the hotel, 
which includes two other wings, respectively completed in 1958 and 1976. The Residence's 
name is due to the legendary writers who stayed at the Oriental, after whom the four suites 
of the old building are nominated: Joseph Conrad, Somerset Maugham, Noel Coward, and 
James Michener. Their books and other memorabilia are part of the suites' furniture (Buckley 
1992:150).
66
The present popularity of the colonial imagery, in large part an aspect 
of the heritage industry itself, is indeed a cultural phenomenon deserving a 
separate analysis. Here it is just possible to notice that nostalgia for the 
colonial epoch is a pervasive trend extending from films (e.g., The  
Sheltering Sky, The Lover, Indochine) to clothes and furn iture fashions 
(e.g., "This is the luggage of another era, when travel was an adventure, 
getting there was as much of an event as being there ... "). What emerges as 
this phenom enon's dom inant meaning is the feeling of regret that the 
masses of consum ers have for a past when tourism  was, socially and 
culturally, an elitistic experience, and hence a status symbol. Paradoxically, 
the "democratisation" of tourism which has allowed more and more people 
to travel widely abroad is itself felt by the tourist masses as having spoilt the 
"aristocracy" of this experience. Given the obvious impractibility of reducing 
the volum e of tourism, the stress is now on the quality (cultural and 
material) which distinguishes the holiday of the classy traveller from that of 
the m ass-tourist.66
Likewise, competition for the tourist market in Southeast Asia, much 
more pronounced today than even only a decade ago, requires an emphasis 
on the unique traits of each destination country, which explains the focus of 
promotion on "culture." Culture, much more than tropical beaches, is seen 
as capable of differentiating societies from each other. Of course, and only 
philistines can be shocked by it, the definition of culture in the context of 
tourism extends in practice to everything that is marketable, from food to 
kite-flying, including the physical remnants of the past transform ed by
66A new luxury train, the Eastern and Oriental Express, has operated since August 1993 
linking Singapore and Bangkok in a 42-hour journey which allows patrons to "get the best of 
two worlds -  the luxury of the train and Asia at your fingertips." Amongst the other 
attractions of the train, "the decoration for each carriage was inspired by the 1932 film 
Shanghai Express, with Burmese emblems carved here and there" (Conway 1993).
scholarly discourses into "heritage." The point, only apparently paradoxical, 
is that the more the process of globalisation, that has in the tourism industry 
a main agent, homogenises habits and landscapes all around the world, the 
more the past and its forms, superseded by development, are iconicised as 
the only reliable sources of national identity. According to Smith (1991:159): 
"This is only to be expected, given the centrality of memory in forging 
identities and cultures, which is why the basic motifs, ideas and styles of 
post-m odern cosmopolitanism are folk or national in origin."
We come thus to the second remark on Wood's analysis, concerning 
the way tourism  affects the interpretation of the "traditional." A parallel 
can be draw n here with the somehow paradigmatic case of Britain, where 
56% of the recently opened museums belong to the private sector (Urry 
1990:106), and in the late 1980s, there were some 1,250 private m useums 
(Hewison 1989:19). As Urry argues, these private initiatives inspire new 
ways of representing history as well as of commodifying the past; and 
although the trend in Britain seems to be toward trivialisation (Hewison 
1987), the coexistence of manifold interpretations of the past could have in 
theory a liberating effect: to couple the actual plurality of histories with a 
plurality of heritages and, in the end, to deprive the state of its monopoly of 
the official national history.
The "Ancient City" (Muang boran) is a private open-air m useum  
located some 30 km. from central Bangkok on an area of 8 square-km. 
Opened in 1972 in the presence of the Thai monarchs, it was built by the 
biggest Mercedes-Benz dealer in Thailand. The exhibit presents a hundred 
small-sized replicas of monuments and buildings (and even some original 
ones, dism antled and reerected here) found all over the country, and
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reproduced here with a philological attention to detail.67 Built before the 
main FAD's restorations, the "Ancient City" has introduced, through its 
"staged heritage," two generations of Thai students to the art and 
architecture of the country. The educational rather than commercial end of 
this enterprise became even clearer in 1974 with the establishment of the 
hom onym ous m agazine; since then, this rather unique synergy has 
championed peasant society, depicted as an Arcadian realm of benevolence, 
in contraposition to the moral and cultural deterioration brought about by 
m odernisation (notwithstanding the owner's main business). Despite the 
valuable scholarship and craftm anship which distinguish the "Ancient 
City" from similar attractions, Thai tradition is em phasised here again 
nostalgically and uncritically, while avoiding the reality of conflict and 
dom ination in the past.68
In any case, the number of private museums in Thailand is extremely 
limited. In a country where the ethos of private entrepreneurship has 
proved to be the engine of a successful economic developm ent, it is 
remarkable the extent to which the "heritage industry" has been, at least 
until now, a sort of state m onopoly. If this has prevented national 
m useum s and heritage displays from becoming too m arket-oriented and 
thus retaining more of their original character, it has also been a means to 
ensure that the interpretations of the past conveyed by these institutions 
were not contrasting with state definitions of national and cultural identity.
67For example, the murals inside the replica of the Grand Palace's Dusit Maha Prasat depict 
events at the time the hall was built (the First Reign), unlike the murals of the real building, 
executed during the Sixth Reign.
68The visit to the "Ancient City" inspired the wife of Indonesian President Suharto to build a 
sim ilar them e-park, M ini Indonesia (Taman Indonesia Mini). Because of the initial 
opposition to the project of Mini-Indonesia, Suharto made of its realisation a test about the 
solidity of its leadership.
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Teasing out the implications behind the official interpretation of major Thai 
heritage sites is the aim of the next chapter.
4. National Heritage Sites:
Topoi of the Nationalist Narrative
This chapter is a sort of guide to a selected num ber of Thai heritage 
sites. The Greek word topos itself originally means site, place, but it is used 
in textual analysis to designate an image or theme recurrent in, and hence 
emblematic of, the work of art of an individual or a period. As a presence 
easily recognisable in the territory of literary and figurative texts, a topos has 
a special capacity for evocation. Now, it is tautological to say that every 
heritage site is spatially located; however, only a few heritage sites are, in the 
narrative through monuments outlined here, topoi as well, that is, only few 
have a place not just in Thailand's geographical space but also in Thai 
collective consciousness as national icons. Their popularity makes such 
monuments naturally referential of those ideas and feelings about the past 
that are uttered by the pervasive state discourses of history, identity and 
nationhood. A journey to these sites through Thailand's territory is thus 
also a journey in time through the layers of the official past sanctioned by 
the nationalist narrative, from the Khorat Plateau's K hm er-dom inated 
principalities of the ten th -th irteen th  centuries to Thai independent 
kingdom s of the thirteenth-eighteenth  centuries in the Central Plain, 
Sukhothai and Ayutthaya, to the modern Bangkok-centered nation-state.
Of course, the sites dealt with in the following exposition are but a few 
samples of the Thai heritage that is today available to the visitor thanks to 
the excavations and restorations carried out by the Fine Arts Departm ent 
(FAD) in the last three decades. However, the choice is not arbitrary.
According to the Thai Weltanschauung that allocates every element its 
proper place in a hierarachic order, there exists a hierarchy of monuments as 
well. The archaeological sites described in the first two sections all belong to 
the restricted category of historical parks (utthayan prawatisat) . 69 With 
regard to Bangkok's historic sites, the choice is easily justified because they 
instantly conjure up Thailand's uniqueness. In fact, much more is at stake 
in the capital, because there originate the symbols of legitimacy that imbue 
the actuality of the Thai polity.
4.1 Remnants of Thailand's Khmer Past
In the late 1980s, after years of restoration work by the FAD, three 
outstanding archaeological sites were reinstalled in the national heritage's 
main catalogue under the entry "historical parks." These m onuments lie 
w ithin Thailand's borders, have been recognized for some time by Thai 
people as part of their patrimony, and have been labelled for years by art 
historians as examples of "Lopburi art." Yet, artistically speaking, they are 
not Thai at all. In fact, the Tourist Authority of Thailand (TAT) now 
prom ote these heritage sites as "the finest Khmer m onum ents of the 
Angkor period to be seen outside Kampuchea." (TAT c: 6). They are shrines 
that the Khmer built along the road to Angkor, the heart of the most 
powerful polity in m ainland Southeast Asia between the ninth and the 
early fifteenth century. The three monuments, and the relative historical 
parks in question, are Prasat Muang Sing, Prasat Phimai, and Prasat Phanom 
Rung.
69There are nine established historical parks in Thailand. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 cover seven of 
them. The remaining two are the archaeological site of Si Thep, in Phetchabun province; and 
the royal palace built by Rama IV on the top of a hill at Nakonkhiri, in Phetchaburi 
province.
The first inauguration, in April 1987, was that of M uang Sing 
Historical Park (Kanchanaburi province), where excavation started in 1974 
and restoration began in 1982. Chronologically, however, the sanctuary 
(p r a s a t ), built in the Bayon style of Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218), is the 
latest and the westernmost among the three. Located at the center of the 
walled town of M uang Singh, the shrine was apparently a M ahayana 
tem ple, as the unearthed  stone sta tues of A valok itesvara  and 
Prajnaparam ita suggest. The structure of the tower ( p r a n g )  is of laterite, 
with stucco decorations showing the unusual presence of Dvaravati, Khmer 
Bayon and proto-Thai styles (Subhadradis 1979). In a small exibition hall, 
the excavation's findings are now on display, including the statuary, 
carvings, implements and pottery shards. The park includes a parking area, 
services, and a tin-roof hall for the reception of school students.70
Phanom Rung Historical Park (Buriram province) was unveiled by 
Princess Sirindhorn the 21 May, 1988, on "Thai cultural preservation day," 
after a twelve-year genesis begun in 1977 under the Phanom Rung Historical 
Park Project (restoration by anastylosis had however already started in 1971). 
According to Subhadradis Diskul (1979), the sanctuary was a sort of work-in- 
progress developing from the m iddle of the tenth to the early thirteenth 
centuries, thus pre-dating in its original core Angkor Wat itself. The temple 
lies along the road connecting the old Khmer capital with Phimai and was 
dedicated to Siva, the deity worshipped in many of the Khmer courts. 
Phanom Rung has a special place in the revival of national heritage for the 
resonance of the anonymous appeal, eventually successful, made in 1988 
through some Thai newspapers to have returned a lintel stolen from the
70In 1992 only, the total revenue from the entry tickets at Muang Sing Historical Park has 
been about 1.300.000 bath (Thai 5 baths, Foreign 20 baths entrance fee).
sanctuary in the mid-1960s and exhibited since 1967 in the Art Institute of 
Chicago, an episode which has been acutely analysed by Charles Keyes (1991)..
Phimai Historical Park (Nakhon Ratchasima province) opened in 
1989 after a long period of restoration work initially started in 1964 with the 
supervision of the French archaelogists B. P. Groslier and P. Pichard, 
supervisors also of the restoration of Prasat Phanom Rung, whose plan and 
style are similar to those of Prasat Phimai. The im plem entation of the 
park's project started, however, only in the early 1980s under the Fifth 
National Plan. Prasat Phimai, the biggest Khmer temple in Thailand (and 
hence, outside Cambodia), was built, according to Subhadradis Diskul, in the 
first Angkorian style during the reign of Suryavarm an II (the builder of 
Angkor Wat) in the first half of the twelfth century, and then restored by 
Jayavarm an VII towards the end of the century (Pisit and Subhadradis 
1976:161). The tem ple's stone carvings show a variety of motifs, from 
Tantric Buddhist to H induist; moreover, some of their features are 
m oreover peculiar to Prasat Phimai only. Srisakara (1990:235) sees the 
Buddhist Mahayana subjects of these carvings as dem onstration of the fact 
that the area of the Mun River valley, where Buddhism had flourished 
earlier before Angkor's expansion, retained the original religious creed even 
during the period of Khmer dominance.
Prasat Phimai, unlike most Khmer temples facing east, is turned to 
south-east in the direction of the road to Angkor. Some scholars, however, 
suggest that it pre-dates, like Phanom Rung, Angkor Wat itself, and that the 
lotus-bud shaped superstructures of their towers may have indeed provided 
the m odel for the more glorious follower (Sonthiwan 1986:12). This 
Historical Park, at the centre of Phimai small town, is an example of the 
upgrading of local heritage to national relevance in a way which balances
the grandeur of Sukhothai. Not far from the sanctuary is the office of the 
Sixth Division of the FAD, where excavations are carried out in the 
proximity of other Khmer remains, including a hospital, a reservoir, and a 
landing stage for ceremonies. Between 1989 and 1992, in the four years 
following its inauguration, Phimai Historical Park has been visited by the 
remarkable number of 834,505 people (734,987 Thais and 99,518 foreigners).71 
Another 10,861 people have, in 1991 alone, visited the local m useum  
(National Museums Division 1991:33).
Besides these three historical parks, the July 1992 issue of the TAT 
Exotic Thailand bulletin advertised the reopening of Khao Phra Vihan 
(Preah Vihear in Khmer), another famous Khmer hill sanctuary built in the 
eleventh century during the reign of King Suriyavarman I and consecrated 
to Siva. The temple, on the Thai-Cambodian border, had been at the center 
of an in ternational d ispu te  over its ow nership  betw een the two 
governm ents which was eventually solved by the International Court of 
Justice in 1962 w ith the ackowledgem ent of Cam bodian rights (Keyes 
1991:279). However, the temple lies now in the territory controlled by the 
Khmer Rouge; the fact that in the above-mentioned bulletin the entrance- 
fee is given in Baht suggests that Thai authorities may presently have some 
form of management over the access to the temple, originally designed to be 
approached from the northern  side, which is today that on the Thai 
border.72
71 Figures obtained in situ, January 1933.
72 The admission-fees to Pheah Vihear, unusually high for Thai standard, are as follows: 
Baht 60 for Thai adults, 20 for children, 5 for Thai students in uniform; and Baht 200 for 
foreigners (100 for children). It is worth noting that Preah Vihear has been included by 
Smitthi and Moore (1992) in their recent glossy book on Khmer temples in Thailand.
As we have seen, the three parks containing the renovated shrines all 
opened in the late 1980s, a few years before it was again possible to visit 
Angkor Wat as a result of the treaty signed in Paris in October 1991 among 
the four parties involved in the Cambodian civil war. The slowness and 
uncertainty of the peace process in Cambodia most likely induced the FAD 
and the TAT to make available as soon as possible the national patrimony of 
Khmer architecture. Now a three-day visa for Cambodia can be easily 
obtained in Bangkok, and once in Phnom Penh it is possible to reach 
Siemreap by land. Still, the very closeness of Angkor Wat to the much 
more perilous "sanctuaries" of the Khmer Rouge in the jungle along the 
Thai border still conditions, and every now and then jeopardises, tourists 
going there. The Khmer shrines in Thailand have thus become for 
foreigners a sort of substitute for Angkor Wat, and tour-operators in 
Bangkok sell package-tours of a few days to Isan's Khmer temples, which are 
quite hard to reach by means of public transport. Prasat Muang Sing, in the 
western province of Kanchanaburi, can be visited instead on a day trip from 
Bangkok.
I shall argue that economic gains from tourism constitute one main 
reason for the "rediscovery" of the Khmer tem ples in Thailand. 
Unquestionably Khmer art, thanks to the change in the political climate (if 
not in the reality) of the region, is enjoying a revival that tour operators, 
m useum s and publishers are trying to exploit; and the developm ent of 
tourism as a propellent for the economic take-off of Isan, the poorest region 
of Thailand, is pivotal in the "Green Northeast" Government Project. The 
historical parks of Phim ai and Phanom Rung undoubted ly  constitute 
excellent attractions. Moreover, they fit into the greater plan of repackaging 
Thailand as a destination aimed at the "cultural tourist." The attem pt to 
promote the region as a tourist destination may explain the present trend of
stressing Isan's unique cultural profile, a trend which goes against one 
hundred years of effort to make the N ortheast conform to the national 
standard. Today Isan's characteristics are seen as potential attractions to 
exploit: the distinctive language and cuisine, the Khmer cultural heritage 
and a rural environment strikingly divergent from the industrial landscape 
of the Central Plain make the Northeast the real exotic core of "Exotic 
Thailand," an alternative travel destination of great appeal to both foreign 
and domestic tourists looking for "authenticity."73
Still, beyond the commercial aims, a more ideological intent can be 
discerned from the restoration of Thailand's Khmer remnants insofar as it 
is m anifest that the great mass of visitors to these parks are Thais 
themselves. Keyes (1991) has argued that the elevation of the Khmer 
heritage in Thailand from local to national relevance is a way to sustain 
Thai claims to the legacy of Angkor, a legacy for which a competition has 
existed since the time of the French protectorate between the Cambodian 
and the Thai monarchies. Indeed, in the 1860s, King M ongkut ordered a 
model of Angkor Wat to be built within the precinct of the royal chapel, 
Wat Phra Keo. Nevertheless, the enormous iconic potency of Angkor Wat 
appears today to rest firmly within the cultural heritage of the Cambodian 
n a t io n .74 Is it, then, precisely Angkor's legacy that the Thai state is 
articulating a claim to by means of its heritage policy?
73Revealing in this regard is the following paragraph is taken from the TAT booklet (p. 2) on 
Isan:"The Northeast is a singularly distinctive region. The inhabitants of Isan speak their 
melodious dialect, have a delicious, highly spiced cuisine, and a colourfully vibrant and 
oftentimes boisterous folk culture. Isan boasts several archaeological significant excavations 
and shrines. . . . "
74Keyes himself (1991:264) mentions the fact that the silhouette of Angkor Wat has been on 
the national flag of every Cambodian government since the country's independence in 1954.
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After having been besieged twice by the Siamese, possibly in 1369 and 
1389, Angkor was finally abandoned in the early 1430s, when King Ponhea 
Yat decided to move further south to Basan, and then to the site of present- 
day Phnom Penh. The city was apparently abandoned since then, although 
is likely that local people had still knowledge of it. Since the establishment 
of the French protectorate over the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1863 (three 
years after Mouhot's discovery of the city ruins), obtaining the territory with 
Angkor, under Siamese suzerainity since 1769, became a major concern for 
King Sisowath, "the most important event of the reign" (Chandler 1992: 
150). Eventually, the provinces of Siemraep and Battambang were extorted 
from Siam in 1907 as one of the conditions for settling the question of the 
1893 war reparations.75 The Siamese elite did not lose interest in Angkor, as 
shown by the lecture "Angkor from a Siamese point of view" which Prince 
Damrong gave in English on the 28th of July 1925 at the Siam Society, soon 
after a visit to the site (Davis 1989:85). The legacy of Angkor was naturally of 
some relevance to the Thai monarchy, whose origin and ceremonial directly 
descend from it. This genealogical legacy was, however, already self-evident 
and did not require further legitimisaton, as Chulalongkorn's updating of 
the sovereign's prerogatives decisively moved away from the beliefs in the 
king's sacrality. Hence, I suggest that the Siamese elite was engaged in 
competition not with the Cambodian kings but with the French, and not for 
Angkor's legacy, but for the status of Angkor's owner, the status of colonial 
(rather than colonised) country. A point not to undervalue is that the 
ownership of the magnificent ruins implied control of a substantial territory
75King Chulalongkorn "collapsed in remorse" at the extent of the territorial losses and for 
the next twelve months "the wheels of government almost completely ceased to turn", as 
Girling (1981:48, n.92) recalls by quoting Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand, Yale 
U.P. (1969: pp. 95-96). Notably, Angkor ruins remained under French control even during the 
brief period 1941-46 , when the two provinces, considered since 1907 as Siamese unredeemed 
territories, were reannexed thanks to the Japanese help and the pliability of the Vichy 
collaborationist government.
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for which a war, though short, had been fought between France and Siam in 
1893.
It is the fate of monumental ruins like those of Angkor to laud not 
only the greatness of their builders but that of their conquerors alike. This is 
particularly true in the case of Angkor and the Thais, as I shall argue. It is 
very important to consider that the first document showing the existence of 
Siamese as an ethnic group is an Angkor Wat bas-relief depicting a band of 
Syam Kuk mercenaries from the Chao Phraya valley beside recruited 
Lopburi troops. Of them, Wyatt (1984:30) writes in his royalist history of 
Thailand that "they were becoming a force to be reckoned with." In effect, 
this bas-relief speaks to us with afterwit. It proves the endurance of the 
Thais, already there at the time of Angkor, and still there when Angkor was 
no more because they -  the subordinates turned masters -  depopulated it. 
Inheriting the Khmer legacy was possible for the Thai kingdom  of 
A yutthaya because, like Rome with Greece, it had earlier subjugated 
Angkor. At the beginning of this century, the possession of Angkor 
switched from the Thais to the French. Yet this discontinuity in rule 
implied the equivalence of the rulers, with Siam equated to France on a 
level of relative superiority in comparison to the other "uncivilised" Asian 
elites, "incapable" of running their own countries and, incidentally, taking 
care of the artistic inheritance of their ancestors.
It is difficult to say what the fate of Angkor would have been without 
the French construction of the m yth of it as a w onder of the world, a 
construction that, in the best tradition of Orientalism, brought together 
genuine and valuable scholarship and the rationale for colonialist 
dom ination imbued in the equation that by salvaging Angkor, French rule 
was salvaging civilisation tout court. Still, the colonial grandeur of French
Indochina is by now a memory good only for movie nostalgia. Among the 
contenders of one century ago, it is the Kingdom of Thailand that has 
succeeded in imposing its regional supremacy, not by means of imperial 
arm ies bu t th rough  present-day  w arfare, nam ely, business, w hose 
conceptualisation as war is unfolded in the historical novel "Three Reigns"
(Sam kok), a publishing success of impressive dim ension in Thailand in 
recent years (Reynolds 1992b). Subtending Thailand's leading position in 
m ainland Southeast Asia is the mission civilisatrice carried on by the FAD, 
whose expertise in the restoration of Khmer temples (that include also 
Prasat Banphluang, Surin; Prasat Kamphaeng Yai, Sisaket; M uang Tam, 
Buriram; Phanom  Wan, Nakhon Ratchasima) has m atured enough to ask 
for a revision of the stylistic paradigims established by French scholarship: 
"The special qualities that exist only in Khmer works in Thailand are now 
being recognised, and it is likely that soon a new means of classifying Khmer 
art in Thailand will be created," as we read in a recent "made in Thailand" 
sum ptuous coffee-table book enriched by Sirindhorn's foreword (Smitthi 
and Moore 1992:31).76
M eanwhile, to the affluent Thais who go to Angkor as tourists and 
investors the national press presents, not surprisingly, the Cambodian ruins 
with the same stereotypes and racial bias which contributed to the French 
m ythicisation of Angkor. The m yth naturally asks how such indigent 
people as the Cambodians could have ever been prosperous enough to build 
a m onum ent like Angor W at.77 Of course, the bas-relief depicting the
76The book mentions Sirindhorn's confutation of Coedes' interpretation of Inscription K. 384, 
found at Phanom Rung. The inscription, whose content according to Coedes refers to the 
Angkorian King Suryavarm an II, is instead seen by the Princess as praising the local ruler 
N avendraditya. The authors take the Princess' reading as evidence of the fact that the rulers 
of Phanom Ruang were autonomous rather than vassals to Angkor (Smitthi and Moore 1992: 
268).
77"The shortage of everything in Cambodia left me wondering how the country could even 
really have been rich enough for the ancient Khmer kings to have constructed those
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Siamese arm y is recommended as ”a-must-stop for every Thai who visits 
the Angkor" (Kasetsiri 1993:84),78 and there is no need to ask why:
They [the Siamese army] are regarded by Western historians as the barbaric 
mercenaries who worked for the Khmers. Whether it is, the "Siamese warriors" is one 
of the most important record of the pre-empire [sic] Siam. . . . Since the fall of the 
Angkor in the year 1431, the battle for the local economic power has just started.
Indeed, it was in the late 1980s that the (then) Thai prime minister Chatichai 
launched a foreign policy synthesised in the slogan of transform ing the 
Indochinese battle-fields into market-places. Since then, the economic and 
political elites of the country have worked to pave the way for Bangkok's 
regional suprem acy. That way goes through the heart of m ainland 
Southeast Asia, just like the old way to Angkor. It is thus perhaps no 
w onder that the ancient sanctuaries along that road have become 
resplendent again.
4.2 Ancient Capitals of a Manufactured Nation
According to several scholars, modern Thai identity is the result of 
the interaction of two models or traditions, those of Sukhothai and 
Ayutthaya, the two kingdoms that in Thai official discourse epitomise the 
past of the nation-state or, to put it correctly, its projection into the past. 
W hereas the Sukhothaian trad ition  offers a paternalistic  and fairly
unequalled stone sanctuaries. I'm more willing to plump for the ready answer that they were 
created by gods" (Nilubol 1993). This theme of the contrast between Angkor's greatness and 
the Khmer people's status, although fully developed by French colonialist discourse, had 
been already expressed by Thais at the time of Ayutthaya:"The old Siamese histories testify 
that [Angkor] was so exquisite and ingenious that no human being could have built it. 
Therefore, they say that angels from heaven came to help in building this magnificent city in 
Cambodia" (Jeremias van Vliet, The Short History of the Kings of Siam (1640), trans. 
Leonard Andaya. Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1975, p. 60. Quoted in Reid [1988:67]).
78This and the following quotation are from Kasetsiri's article's summary in English, very 
likely an editorial work.
egalitarian  model, the A yutthayan tradition accounts for the highly 
hierarchic social structure and the divine character of the monarchy. There 
is, however, a major difference in the way the two traditions have been 
internalised in Thai collective consciousness. The legacy of Ayutthaya was 
acknowledged since the establishment of the Bangkok kingdom in 1782, 
fifteen years after Ayutthaya's fall: Rattanakosin's social and economic 
structure, its conception of kingship and religious practices, even the plan of 
its capital had Ayutthaya as their proclaimed model. On the contrary, the 
heritage of Sukhothai was recovered after centuries of oblivion and notably 
during the crucial stage, from the reigns of Mongkut to Vajiravudh, that 
changed the aspect of the traditional kingdom and laid the foundations of 
the m odern nation-state.
In fact, the two traditions of Sukhothai and Ayutthaya, opposing and 
complementing each other like yin and yang in the Taoist universe, can be 
seen as the result of the mythologising activity sustaining the process of 
nation-building in m odern Siam. Brahmanic cosmology, the source of 
legitimacy in Ayutthaya, had been retained in its function by the first Chakri 
kings. Yet, to the eyes of King Mongkut that esoteric myth of foundation 
was probably an obstacle to a closer relationship between the sovereign and 
his subjects at a time when, looking at the events in China, Burma and 
Vietnam , a greater national unity could w ork as a barrier against 
colonialism. The danger that Siam was facing required a new foundation 
m yth to fortify the fabric of the kingdom. The stone inscription which 
M ongkut claimed to have discovered in 1833 wondering around the ruins 
of Sukhothai, w hether a genuine document or w ritten ex novo, served 
exactly this purpose.
As a result, Thais learnt that before sakdina society, where everyone 
was ranked and the king was a deity who could not even be looked at, there 
had been a golden age in the past of Siam, a time when whoever wished to 
express a complaint directly to the king could do that by simply ringing a 
bell; and the king himself allowed free commerce w ithout imposing tolls. 
Even M ongkut's m oralising reform of the sangha,  which led to the 
establishm ent of the Thammayut order, was to bring back the essence of 
Thainess to a state of mythical purity and strength (cf. Tambiah 1976).79 
Indeed, M ongkut desperately needed legitimation for the changes he was 
pursuing, and he found this legitimation in the authority of the indigenous 
tradition of Sukhothai.
The peculiarity  of this Siamese "invention of tradition" is that 
Sukhothai as the foundation m yth of the m odern Thai polity did not 
replace Ayutthaya as a result of a change in the pow er-holding group. 
Rather, the two myths became complementary in legitimising a monarch 
w ith both the titles and roles of "righteous ruler" (dhammaraja ) and 
"divine ruler" (devaraja). M ongkut's aim of linking the Chakri dinasty 
with the Kingdom of Sukhothai had propitious support in the fact that 
Rama I himself had allegedly discovered the ruins of the old city hidden in 
the thick of the jungle, and had ordered the removal of num erous Buddha 
images to Bangkok, including the seated bronze Buddha today at Wat 
Suthat. M ongkut, on his part, identified the alleged Ram kham haeng 
throne, the M anansilapatra, which was placed in the Dusit Maha Prasat, in 
the Grand Palace.80
79Jf should be reminded that only during Mongkut's reign Buddhist scriptures began to be 
written in Thai. Until the fourth reign, Pali Buddhist texts written in Khmer script had been 
retained, and there were many monks versed in that language (Na Paknam 1985:39).
80"King Ramakhamhaeng's stone throne was called the M anansilapatra, which stood in the 
'Sugar Palm Grove,' and is associated with stories of the king's righteous administration: He
The definitive stamp on the myth of Sukhothai was the work of King 
Vajiravudh. He created a nationalist mythology, similar to W agner's 
Nibelung cycle, centered on the character of Phra Ruang, a legendary king 
from the Chronicle of the North. Phra Ruang -  whose deeds Vajiravudh 
told in the genres of a traditional dance drama, a m odern dram a and a 
musical, w ritten between 1912 and 1924 -  is in fact Rama VPs alter ego, the 
hero of the independent kingdom of Sukhothai (read Siam) who dem ands 
his subjects to "not destroy our nation but combine your spirit and your 
strength to preserve the state." (Vella 1978:209;211). Vajiravudh's cry for the 
contem porary condition of Sukhothai was expressed in a travel account 
entitled "A Journey in the Land of Phra Ruang" (Thiao Muang Phra Ruang), 
reprinted for the occasion of a royal cremation in 1977, the year the green- 
light was given to the Sukhothai Historical Park Project. How ever, 
although an initial registration of Sukhothai archaeological sites was 
conducted in 1935, funds for the restoration of the ruins were not available 
until the early 1950s, during Phibun Songkhran's post-war government.
The interest Phibun took in preserving the national heritage was one 
form of his attem pt to appropriate the symbolism which legitimises royal 
authority. The existence of two myths of foundation at the root of the Thai 
polity m ade possible a split of roles. While the king could retain his 
devaraj  a - dhammaraj  a p reroga tives, Phibun, d u rin g  his post-w ar 
prem iership, and especially Sarit afterwards (the latter, though, bowing to 
the m onarch's symbolic preminence), tried to take on the role of "father of 
the population" (phokun), setting them directly in touch with the feelings
is alleged to have sat on it when affairs of state were being transacted and to have received 
the homage of his vassals. The remarkable tradition is that on uposatha days the king 
invited monks to come to the palace and sit on the M anansilapatra throne to expound the 
dhamma" (Tambiah 1976:85).
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and the needs of the people. Money for the restoration of the Sukhothai 
monuments (among those, Was Sa Si, Wat Si Chum, Wat Si Sawai) started 
by the FAD in 1953, were obtained from the State Lottery Bureau, while 
Wichit W athakan, friend and intellectual mentor both of Phibun and Sarit, 
used his literary talents to revive the figure of Phokhun Ramkhamhaeng, 
pseudo-historical hero of a populist mythology which had its roots in 
Vajiravudh's plays:
There are not important men in Sukhothai and there is not ruler of men. In Sukhothai 
there are only father and children. . . .  I am the father of all who reside in Mnang Thai. 
. . .  I am Phokhun Ramkhamhaeng. . . . There is not ruler in Sukhothai, only father, 
father of city and Phokhun.
(From "The Prowess of Phokhun Ramkhamahaeng" by Luang Wichit Wathakan, in 
Thak [1978:749])
In 1964 the government approved the project for the preservation of the 
ancient cities of Sukhothai, Si Satchanalai and Kamphaeng Phet, and in the 
following five years excavation and restoration works were carried out by 
the FAD at these sites. Meanwhile, a request made to UNESCO to provide 
assistance led to a visit of experts in 1968 and, subsequently, to a supporting 
international campaign launched in 1979. In 1976 the archaeological area of 
Sukhothai was declared a national historical park, followed by Kamphaeng 
Phet in 1980, and by Si Satchanalai three years later.
The M aster Plan of the Sukhothai H istorical Park D evelopm ent 
Project (UNESCO 1982) -  prepared by a m ultidisciplinary team of Thai 
specialists since October 1976 (the same month the period of open politics 
was violently brought to an end) -  was included in the Fourth and Fifth 
National Economic and Social Development Plans (1977-1986), and formally 
approved by the Thai government in October 1978. The project has been 
divided into two five-years phases, with a total budget allocation of Bath 
220.6 million (about US$ 9 million).81 The gigantic project, covering a 70
81 For the detailed outline of the project expenses see Ishizawa and Kono (1986:58).
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square-kilometer area with 193 monuments, included six sub-plans: land 
use, archaeological excavation and restoration, landscaping improvement, 
com m unity development, realisation of facilities, and tourist prom otion 
(Ishizawa and Kono 1986: 51). In practice this has meant the resettlement of 
200 househo lds, the construction  of roads, w ater resources and 
infrastructure as car-parks, rest-rooms, an information centre and an open- 
air theatre. The Thai government provided 153 million Baht between 1977 
and 1988; the international community, through UNESCO sponsorship and 
single state (mainly Japanese) bilateral cooperation, contributed about 18.5 
m illions Baht, while 5 million came from private Thai donors (FAD 
1988:30-32). The Sukhothai H istorical Park was finally opened on 
November 14, 1988, to celebrate the king's fifth cycle and the the "Year of 
the Longest Reigning Monarch" (Raja Manglapisek). Eventually, the 
archaeological com pound of Sukhothai, Si Satchanalai and Kamphaeng 
Phet was nominated, along with Ayutthaya, a World Heritage site in August 
1991.
The FAD restoration aroused a wave of criticism, mainly voiced by 
the magazine Muang Boran. Whereas some, even w ithin the FAD itself, 
have blam ed inexperience and haste, the critics' m ain charge is the 
alteration of archaeological evidence through arbitrary reconstruction of 
monuments in order to suit the interests of the tourism industry pursued by 
the TAT cooperating with the FAD in the implementation of the Historical 
Park. Dhida Saraya, a historian who initially joined the commitee that drew 
the master plan, has w ritten of "newly created environm ents stemming 
from historical fictions and myths . . .  a park rich in fantastic structures and 
recreational sites reflecting no trace or shadow of the urban setting and 
planning of the past" (Dhida 1987:40). The FAD replied to the charge by 
asserting the historical veracity of the park, whose shape and landscaping
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have been draw n from the description of the city found in the 
Ramkhamhaeng inscription: and this, ironically or opportunely, just at the 
time the inscription’s authenticity was under debate. Finally, in order to 
stop the quarrel, the FAD issued in 1985 a new set of regulations for 
archaeological restoration referred to as the Bangkok Charter, discussed 
earlier.
Flowever sound the criticism may be, the Sukhothai Historical Park 
has been very successful. Since the year of its opening, there have been 
433,476 visitors in 1989; 396,150 in 1990; and 373,338 in 1991.82 Moreover, 
these figures have to be read against the background of the relative 
unpopu larity , in term s of visitors, of Sukhothai am ongst the Thais 
(Silpakorn 1991, 34:1). Besides, the Ramkhamhaeng National M useum, 
opened in 1964 within the walled area of the city, had in 1991 66,232 visitors, 
38,026 of whom were foreigners, ranking as the fifth most visited national 
m useum (National Museums Division 1991:33). It is clear that the general 
public who visit the park is not concerned with methodological questions of 
the restoration of archaeological sites. The m onum ents impress exactly 
because they look not like scattered ruins, but recognisable architecture. The 
landscape is luxuriant, with trees, plants and reservoirs. Concrete roads 
connecting the m onuments allow the park to be visited at an easy pace, 
whether by coach, bicycle, or local tram-car. The entrance-fee is a mere 20 
Baht for foreigners and 10 for Thai for the walled-area, and the same fee is 
charged for the main m onuments outside the city wall, such as Wat Si 
Chum and Wat Phra Phailuang, a negligible charge even for family groups, 
whom I met, wishing to picnic in the park's evocative surroundings.
82These figures were collected at the office of the Sukhothai Historical Park. They do not 
refer to the calendar year, but to the twelve-month period between October and the next 
September.
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At Ayutthaya, a major part of the restoration was done by the FAD in 
two phases: in 1956 (Wat Boromphuttharam, Wat Lokkayasuttha, Wat 
Thammikarat, Wihan Phra Mongkhonbophit), the year of the highest peak 
of restoration of Buddhist monuments under the Phibun regime (Thak 
1978:717); and mainly during the first half of the 1970s (Wat Mahathat, Wat 
Ratchaburana, Wat Phra Si Sanphet, the Royal Palace). In effect, an initial 
preservation project was approved by the government in 1969 with a budget 
allocation of one million Baht per year, but the project for the realisation of 
the Ayutthaya Historical Park over an area of about 3 square-kilometers on 
the island city has been implemented only since 1977 under the fourth plan. 
In 1989 the annual budget allocation was about eight million Baht 
(Peerapun 1991:118). The 1991 listing of Ayutthaya as a World Heritage site 
may lead to an arrangement of the archaeological sites modelled after the 
Sukhothai Historical Park, including the removal of settlements from these 
areas.
However, because of the Burmese ravages of 1767, what remains of 
Ayutthaya is in quite a poor condition, worsened by subsequent 
resettlements and new constructions during the last two hundred years.83 
For this reason, the nomination of Ayutthaya as World Heritage site makes 
the most of its role as a cosmopolitan economic centre as well as originator 
of modern Thai culture (Silpakorn 1991, 34:4). Yet, given the scantiness of 
its archaeological remnants, the image of Ayutthaya is essentially one passed
83A fine reconstruction of Sanphet Prasat, the royal palace in the early Ayutthaya period, is 
in the "Ancient City," Samut Prakan. The palace, with a cruciform shape, was apparently 
built in 1448 by King Borom Trailokanat, the eighth monarch of Ayutthaya. The palace, 
whose architecture became typical of the Ayutthaya style, was where foreign dignitaries 
were granted audience. Of course, with bricks as the only remains, the replica has been 
essentially based on Thai and European accounts of the time, matched with contemporaneous 
artefacts.
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on, through reports and, in particular, maps, by contem porary W estern 
visitors, from the Dutch E. Kaempfer and Jeremias van Vliet to the French 
Simon de La Loubere. Besides, the criteria for its W orld H eritage 
nomination apparently avoid a thorny question which has for decades been 
at the center of Thai historical and political debate. The question whether 
the sakdina society of Ayutthaya was a feudal system based on slavery, 
whose power-relations survived almost unchanged in the new kingdom  
established in Bangkok fifteen years after its fall. And this would be one 
aspect of the heritage of Ayutthaya unquestionably hard to magnify.
In addition to the ruins scattered in the island area, in Ayutthaya 
there are two national museums: Chao Sam phraya, which w ith 93,868 
visitors (9,688 of whom were foreigners) in 1991 ranked as the fourth most 
visited m useum  in Thailand (Annual Report 1991:33);84 and Chankesam, 
much less visited (12,594 vistors), but in itself a piece of national heritage. 
The original palace, destroyed in 1767, was the prince's residence built 
during the reign of King Maha Thammaracha for his son, the future King 
Naresuan, and subsequently used as the Front Palace. Mongkut rebuilt the 
palace, making it a residence for his visits to Ayutthaya. Within its walls 
there is a four-storeyed observatory restored by Mongkut according to the 
original foundations of the time of King Narai, and used by Rama IV for his 
hobby of astronomy. The exhibition housed in the wooden pavillion was 
initially established by a local prince in 1907 and then proclaimed a national 
museum in 1936 (Na Paknam 1985:144-46).
84The construction of the museum, inaugurated by King Bhumibol in 1961, was financed 
through the sale of sm all Buddha images found during  the excavations at Wat 
Ratchaburana. The m useum  itself appeared later to have been erected on top of an 
archaeological site (Peerapun 1991:115).
Almost opposite to the Chao Samphraya National Museum, stands 
an impressive white building fronted by a large fountain and "designed in a 
modern Thai architectural style emphasising functional aspects of buildings 
situated in a hot and hum id enviroment."85 The building houses the 
Ayutthaya Historical Study Centre inaugurated in August 1990 by Princess 
Sirindhorn, and built with considerable Japanese financial support (990 
million Yen), but with a "philosophy" mainly born out of Bangkok-based 
academics, including the archaeologist Srisakara Vallibothama and the 
economic historian Chatthip N artsupha. The project was originally 
intended as a museum to be built on the area occupied by the Japanese 
settlement at the time of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya. In this site, donated to 
the Thai government by the Thai-Japanese Association, stands today what is 
the annex building, a sort of mausoleum located in a pleasant park along the 
bank of the Pasak River. The enlargement of the original project has led 
instead to the realisation of the main building on Ayutthaya isle, where a 
perm anent exhibition is on display.
This exhibition is indeed somewhat of a novelty by the old-fashioned 
standards of Thai museums. It is organised in four sections, each presenting 
a perspective on the Ayutthaya Kingdom: Ayutthaya as a capital, as a port 
city, as a centralised state, as a village community. Thanks to technological 
devices such as video-monitors, sound effects, interactive maps, and more 
traditional displays such as dioramas, scale-models, and replicas of royal and 
religious paraphernalia, the museum aims to explain rather than impress, 
as the organisers, with a hint of polemics, point out:
88This and the following quotation are taken from the Ayutthaya Historical Study Centre 
brochure.
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The M useum  of the Ayutthaya Historical Centre is different from other museums in 
Thailand by virtue of its special features. It does not focus on collecting and arranging 
displays of priceless antiques such as Buddha images, pottery, and jewelry, leaving 
visitors to imagine for themselves what the social and cultural life of the Ayutthaya 
Kingdom was like from looking at these valuable objects displayed w ithout any 
coherent theme.
What has been the response to the Ayutthaya Historical Centre during its 
first calendar year of activity? A parallel with the visitor figures for the 
national m useum s is telling: although the Centre as a private institution 
charges far more than public m useums,86 with a total of 174,325 visitors 
(96,981 students; 70,626 adults; 6,718 foreigners),87 it has been outclassed in 
1991 only by the National Museum of Phra Nakonkhiri (301,334 visitors), 
and that of Bangkok (210,573 visitors)88 (National M useum s Division 
1991:33). But if we look only at the student figures, then the Ayutthaya 
Centre has received more students than any o ther national m useum . 
Particularly striking, then, is the parallel with the visitor attendance at the 
two national m useum s in Ayutthaya: the attendance at the A yutthaya 
Centre is alone 70% larger than the sum of these two. These figures suggest 
that the time has come to tell young Thais their own past in a more 
appealing way.
Part of the excursion to Ayutthaya is, for many tourists, the visit to 
the Summer Palace of Bang Pa-in, a short trip from the old capital, whether 
by road, railway, or boat descending the Chaophraya. The palace is strongly 
associated w ith  Rama V, although it was originally  built by King 
Phasatthong, and used thereafter as country residence of the A yutthayan 
kings. Abandoned after the fall of the city, the residence was discovered and
86The entrance-fee to the Ayutthaya Historical Study Centre are: 20 Baht for Thai adults; 5 
Bath for single students and school-groups free of charge; 100 Baht for foreign adults; 50 Baht 
for foreign students.
87Statistics collected at the Ayutthaya Historical Study Centre, December 1992.
88These last figures include also the two non-paying categories of monks and official guests.
renovated by King Mongkut. Chulalongkorn built various pavillions there 
in the Thai, Chinese, Victorian, Renaissance and Classical styles between 
1872 and 1876 (these buildings are not open to the visitors). Bang Pa-in is a 
perfect example of the royal patrimony that has come to be identified with 
the national heritage. The SPAFA report (1987:43) describes Bang Pa-in as 
"one of the most significant palaces in Thailand due to its historical 
background as well as being a national symbol." Bang Pa-in is very popular 
with both Thais (pupils are typical patrons here, too) and foreigners for its 
daintiness, the original coexistence of several "exotic" architectures amidst 
luxuriant gardens, a nostalgic grandeur that makes this place the Versailles 
of Thailand. Unlike museums and historical parks managed by the FAD, 
the palace is under the management of the Bureau of the Royal blouse; To 
add an odd touch, just on the opposite bank of the Chaophraya bordering 
the Palace area, there is Wat Nivet, built by Chulalongkorn between 1876 
and 1878 in the shape of a neo-Gothic church for the Thammayut sect, the 
reformed Buddhist order established by his father, Mongkut.
With almost half a million visitors each per year, Sukhothai and 
A yutthaya are the most popular destinations of Thais and foreigners 
interested in the art and history of the country. As m onuments of national 
pride, as material evidence of Thailand's past and of its place amongst the 
great world civilisations, and as big tourist attractions, the ruins of these two 
cities are the most articulated examples of what I have called topoi, i.e., 
heritage sites whose emblematic function in the m ythology of the state 
overwhelms their historical and artistic value, hindering the possibility of a 
critical approach. It is sufficient, in this regard, to imagine what would be of  
Thai national history as it is generally taught w ould be, w ithout the 
centrality ascribed to Sukhothai and Ayutthaya, which were, in truth, two 
localised kingdoms whose suzerainity never extended to the area covered by
the present nation-state. This section has suggested how they have become 
loci of the nationalist narrative, showing also that their remains had been 
salvaged random ly since the 1950s, and only since the late 1970s 
systematically under the historical parks' project. Thus, for a long time the 
ruins of the deserted wat of Sukhothai and Ayutthaya had been meaningful 
to local people only as religious, and by no means nationalist, icons. Their 
Buddhist statuary used to belong to the magical realm of popular belief. In 
order to serve the secular religion of nationalism, these so em pow ered 
Buddha images have now been turned into m useum  pieces, and their 
worshippers from pilgrims into mundane sightseers.
4.3 Symbols of Legitimacy in Thai Urban Space
Contrary to archaeological parks, where "museumified" m onuments 
are isolated in a sanitised environment, historic cities offer the clearest 
exam ple of heritage transform ation through time. There, surviving 
architecture from the past tends to acquire new functions and meanings 
according to a changing urban space accomodating new economic, aesthetic 
and ideological instances. The form of a city is thus rarely definitive but a 
w ork -in -p rog ress, the transito ry  result of con tinuous a ltera tions. 
Particularly in capital-cities, where political pow er needs to manifestly 
address and be addressed, construction and reworking of m onum ental and 
historic buildings is a prim ary vehicle of propaganda. This section 
approaches Bangkok from this point of view. Adm ittedly, it may appear 
ludicrous to argue about Bangkok's symbolism when the consequences of 
three decades of uncontrolled urbanisation have now reached the verge of 
social breakdown, a risk that even the monarchy does not underestim ate.89
Yet, even a glimpse at Bangkok's symbolically significant urban areas will 
reveal something about the nature of the Thai polity.
On the 21st of April 2525 of the Buddhist Era (1982), Bangkok 
celebrated the bicentennial of the Chakri m onarchy and of its own 
foundation. A performance of 2,525 lakhon dancers was held under a full 
m oon in the Grand Palace to open the celebrations. The organising 
commitee, with the then prime minister Prem Tinsulanond as chairman, 
selected fifty-eight buildings and monuments to represent the heritage of 
the historical period started in 1782, the Ratanakosin Era (FAD 1982).90 
More than 1,000 million Baht were spent in improvement and restoration 
projects (Meyer 1988:92). Some 2,000 artisans worked exclusively at the royal 
complex of the Grand Palace and Wat Phra Keo, with a budget of US$ 8 
million (Buckley 1992:108). Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn herself was 
the president of the commitee for the restoration of the royal wat, partly 
financed through a public donation. A monument with the emblems of the 
last four Chakri kings was placed in the precinct of the tem ple in 
correspondence with those of the first three Chakri, of Rama IV, and of 
Rama V. Another US$ 3.5 million were spent to renovate fifty-one royal 
barges (dry-docked since 1967) which were then paraded in a ceremonial 
cruise along the river Chaophraya (Buckley 1992: 121). The occupancy rate 
in first class hotels catering to foreigners did not rise during this period but 
the smaller hotels were fully booked because of the many Thais who went to 
Bangkok to be present at the celebrations (Meyer 1988:92). The 1982 royal 
apotheosis exemplifies the applicability of Geertz’s concept of the theater-
89Recently, Queen Sirikit made a public appeal to solve the problem of endless Bangkok's 
traffic jam. See Bangkok Post, August 12,1993.
90The fifty-eight sites were grouped in five headings: seven royal and princely palaces; 
twenty-one wats; fourteen monuments, including the Democracy M onument; fourteen old 
buildings, including the Fine Arts Department and Vajirayan Library; three characteristic 
sites, namely, the City Pillar, Sanam Luang, and Sanam Chai.
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state w ithin the context of the contemporary Southeast Asian nation-state, 
w here the externalisation of power constitutes the very essence of its 
legitimacy, and the condition of its centrality in the sociocultural system.
The persistence of the Indo-Buddhist conception of kingship as source 
of legitimacy is demonstrated by the enduring sacredness attached to the 
royal palace, which in Buddhist Theravada polities such as Thailand 
replaces Mount Meru as the cosmological center of the universe (Tambiah 
1976:97). The architectural complex of the Grand Palace and the adjacent 
Wat Phra Keo is arguably the most visited among the national monuments. 
Yet a discrepancy exists in the way Thais, who enter it free, and foreigners, 
who pay a 100 Baht entrace-fee, approach the royal compound. While 
foreigners wonder around as tourists, the visit of Thai people "constitute a 
form of pilgrimage, during which obeisance is made to the politico-religious 
symbols of the realm" (Cohen 1992:40). Cohen argues that a norm ative 
quest for merit instead of a request for assistance, the non-accessibility of the 
Buddha image, and the absence of a popular festival adjoining the temple 
mark the difference between the worship of the Emerald Buddha and that of 
the other most venerated Buddha images of the country, as well as Wat 
Phra Keo's status as the sole formal politico-religious center in present-day 
Thailand.
The establishm ent of the Grand Palace-Wat Phra Keo as the formal 
politico-religious center of the Thai polity dates back to the very moment of 
the foundation of Bangkok. Because of its nature as a planned city, Bangkok 
presented  until the 1860s a concentric arrangem ent of u rban  space 
underlining its role as capital. An inner city ring, containing the royal 
citadel and the city pillar, was separated by a wall and a canal (Klong Lot) 
from an outer city ring; this one enclosed through the city walls and a moat
(Klong Ongang) an urban area of 3,5 square-km. (Korff 1986:21-22). This 
layout was draw n in close resemblance to the plan of Ayutthaya (Wenk 
1968: Chap. 2). Buildings like the throne hall (Dusit Maha Prasat), the royal 
wat (Wat Phra Keo), the palace of the second king, corresponded closely to 
Samphet Prasat, Wat Phra Si Sanphet, and Chankasem Palace respectively 
in the old capital. Only in 1786, when the cosmological as well as the 
political orders were reestablished in and around Bangkok, was Rama I's 
coronation performed according to Brahmanic ritual, and the city officially 
nam ed as Krungthep Mahanakhon Bovorn Ratanakosin, etc.91 Town- 
planning was thus a major vehicle to symbolise the continuity between the 
new and the old capitals and, hence, between the Ayutthaya-centered and 
the B angkok-centered kingdom s, despite their ev iden t differences. 
Ironically, it m ight be said that, at the time of its foundation, Bangkok 
looked more like a historical park than a new city.
Between the 1860s and the 1950s, Bangkok's growth did not follow a 
concentric pattern, but was concentrated southeast of Ratanakosin (the 
commercial area), and the northeast (the new adm inistrative and royal 
buildings). This phase of urbanisation reflected the transition from the 
sakdina system to capitalist penetration (Korff 1986:33-77). New Road 
(Charoen Krung), started by King Mongkut in 1862 to connect the W estern 
se ttlem en t w ith  the C hinese quarte r and the royal palace, and 
Ratchadamnoen Avenue, built by Chulalongkorn at the end of the century 
to link the Grand Palace with his new residence in the Dusit area, typify the 
lines along which the pattern of Bangkok's urban developm ent occurred. 
By the end of the last century "a rough 'quartering' had become apparent:
91 The name of the city was slightly altered during the reign of Rama IV, when the city's 
horoscope was reformulated in order to coincide with the personal horoscope of Mongkut. A 
new city-pillar was also celebrate this second "baptism" of the capital (Cook 1992).
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the port area along the southern half of New Road . . . the consular and 
European residential area . . . the 'market' area of Sampeng . . . the 
administrative, religious and cultural focus of Thailand -  the Grand Palace" 
(Sternstein 1966:68-69). In effect, albeit committed to the development of the 
capital, Mongkut and his successor wished to leave their mark on the Grand 
Palace, which was conspicuously enriched during the Fourth and Fifth 
reigns. After the general renovations by Rama III, Mongkut added several 
buildings, including a pavillion, Amphonphimok, in the original Dusit 
Hall group. Chulalongkorn built the Chakri Maha Prasat, begun in 1876 and 
completed in 1882 for the Chakri centenary, and characterised by the hybrid 
of a European-style structure and a Thai roof (Dhaninivat 1990:4-17). Also 
substantially  altered was the aspect of Wat Phra Keo, particularly by 
Mongkut; the temple was again totally restored for Bangkok's centenary 
(Subhadradis n.d.: 26-31).
Rama V's abolition of the institution of the second king led in 1887 to 
the utilisation of three halls of the Front Palace for a public exhibit that 
became the core of the National Museum in its present location at Na Phra 
That Road. The museum, then open twice a week, was given the status of 
directorate in 1889 under the Departm ent of Education (replaced by a 
m inistry in 1892). The creation of the first public "museum" (the English 
word used to name the new institution) dates however back to 1874, when 
C hulalongkorn opened to visitors M ongkut's private collection in the 
G rand Palace (D hanit 1990:3). The N ational M useum  of Bangkok 
("national" was added in 1933 when Wichit-directed FAD took over control 
of it) includes at the present three galleries: the Thai history gallery, housed 
in one of the original buildings; the art and archaeological collections, 
housed respectively in the new southern and northern wings opened in 
1965. Besides, there are other buildings belonging to the original Palace of
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the Front, such as that exhibiting minor arts, the Buddhaisawan Chapel, 
and the M angkhalaphisek Pavillion.
During the fifth reign m onument construction first moved outside 
the ring of Ratanakosin. In 1897 King Chulalongkorn visited some 
European capitals including Paris, whose topography had been recently 
refashioned w ith large boulevards. It is plausible to assume that the visit 
gave Rama V the idea for the realisation of a complex urban space, equally 
significant at the practical and symbolic levels, to project internationally the 
image of Bangkok as a capital-city in line with European standards and 
adequately representing Siam, one of the few sovereign states in Asia. The 
result was the northern Dusit district,92 consisting of the Suan Dusit 
re s id e n c e , W at B encham aboph it (the M arb le  T em ple), and  
Anantasam akhon Throne Hall. The significance of this building was both 
in its im posing dimensions and in its location at the end of the grand 
Ratchadam noen Avenue, Bangkok's Champs-Elysees, where the Siamese 
elite had m ade a show of its modernity in motorcar parades since the later 
years of the fifth reign (Smithies 1986:40). However, the throne hall was 
completed only after King Chulalongkorn's death, and because of the 1932 
coup, it never acquired a firm association with the monarchy. The building, 
where on the 10th of December 1932 King Prajadhipok promulgated the first 
constitution of the country beginning a new era, became the seat of the 
national assembly but with feeble symbolic power; another assembly hall 
was opened in 1974 whilst the old one is usually closed to the visitors. 
Because of the delay in the completion of the throne hall, to celebrate his 
forty years of reign in 1908 Rama V unveiled the 11th of November his
92The name of the district comes from Wat Dusit, built by Rama I on the spot where 
Chulalongkorn erected in 1899 Wat Benchamabophit, which in fact is properly named Wat 
Benchamabophit Dusitwanaram.
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equestrian statue facing that building, and which is said to have had an 
extraordinary impact on the population (Apinan 1992:16).93
C hulalongkorn’s Suan Dusit residence is another major piece of 
national heritage recently restored to splendour thanks to the sponsorship 
of Queen Sirikit. The highlight of the residence is the 31-room teakwood 
Vimanmek Mansion, transported there in 1901 from its original location at 
Koh Si Chang, and inhabited by Rama V until 1907, when he moved to a 
European-style house (Smithies 1986:20). The restoration, conducted 
betw een 1982 and 1985, transform ed Vimanmek and the other four 
buildings of the Dusit compound into a nostalgic yet impressive museum 
about the fifth reign and the Chakri House as pillar of the nation. 
V im anm ek offers to its predom inantly  Thai v isitors a full insight, 
bathroom included, into the daily life of the royal family at the beginning of 
this century, am idst the furniture and memorabilia of the king and his 
relatives, which demonstrate almost an obsession with Victorian taste. And 
indeed, the exhibit leaves no doubt about the "modernity" of this Southeast 
Asian court, whose lifestyle and accoutrements -  e.g., shower-head and 
electric light -  were in no way inferior to that of its Western counterparts. 
On the contrary, it is true that few European m onarchies could, at that 
moment of socialist frenzy, boast of the same admiration and love that the 
Thai population had, and still has, for Chulalongkorn. The identification of 
the Siamese w ith the W estern royal elites is explicit in the exhibitions 
housed in the concrete buildings, with pictures of Rama V's European tours, 
paintings by the m any European artists appointed to his court, and a
93The place where the equestrian statue lies is the gathering point for the worshippers of 
Rama V, whose following has risen to the level of a real cult in present-day Thailand. See 
Nithi (1993).
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collection of gifts presented to the kings of Thailand by foreign dignitaries in 
the period from the fifth to the present reigns.
The construction of m onuments for Bangkok's 150th anniversary 
was, in a time of economic crisis and social discontent, far less lavish than 
in the past. One of the main works commissioned for the occasion was a 
bronze statue of Rama I -realised, after a design of Prince Naris, by the 
Italian sculptor Corrado Feroci 94 -  to be placed at the Pramane Ground. 
King Prajadipok eventually decided to place it at the foot of the Memorial 
Bridge, the first spanning the Chaophraya, inaugurated on the 6th of April 
1932 (Apinan 1992:25). The spot, at the junction of Thonburi and Bangkok, 
exalted the historical significance of the huge statue of Phra Phuttayotfa, 
apparently disavowing his own prophecy of the hundred and fifty years of 
limited longevity of the Chakri dinasty. Two m onths later, however, the 
monarchy was toppled, and in 1939 Feroci was realising in typical Fascist 
style the bas-reliefs for the Democracy M onument, designed by Mew 
Aphaiwong and commissioned by Phibun to celebrate in 1940 the eighth 
year of the constitution.95 Positioned in the m iddle of Ratchadam noen 
Klang, the m onum ent relies on heavy sym bolism .96 Apinan (1992:41)
94Feroci was borne in Florence in 1892. He was appointed a sculptor of the Fine Arts 
Department in 1924, and was later a founder of the School of Fine Arts, Silpakorn University 
and Silpa Sueksa School of Art. In this role, Feroci, who in the 1940s took the name of Silpa 
Bhirasri and Thai citizenship, was the main promoter of m odernism  in Thai plastic and 
figurative arts, fostered through an annual National Exhibition established by Feroci 
himself. Feroci was first professor and then dean of Silpakorn University. He died in 
Bangkok in 1962.
95Reynolds (1992a:319) refers to a metal plate, secured into the roadway facing Rama V's 
equestrian statue, carrying the text: "On this spot, at dawn on 24 June 1932, the People's Party 
created the constitution for the benefit of the nation." The plate -  removed, according to a 
rumour, during the Sarit era -  is, for Reynolds, "probably unknown to most Bangkok residents."
96The four visual "slices" created by the four wings may signify either the pillars of king, 
religion, nation, constitution, or the army, navy, airforce, police; height and radius of the 
monument each measures 24 meters, the date (24th of June) of the coup; the 3 meter high bowl 
sustaining the constitution, refer to the third month (June) of the traditional Thai calendar;
100
m entions tha t the m onum ent's p ro p a g a n d is ts  in ten t was largely 
misinterpreted, with the soldiers rushing with rifles seen as defenders of the 
monarchy instead of the constitution. And it certainly was for its name, 
rather than for its iconology, that the Democracy Monument gained a great 
popu larity  in the period 1973-76, when its image was used by the 
progressives as a political emblem. Another major piece of Phibun's 
a rch itec tu ra l p ropaganda, the Victory M onum ent, inaugura ted  on 
Constitution Day, the 24th of June 1941, and furnished with Feroci's martial 
sculptures, had a similar fate: its position in the urban context was badly 
chosen, rendering its meaning obscure (Apinan 1992:46).97
It is remarkable, however, that apart from the construction of these 
isolated monuments, not even during the anti-royalist Phibun regimes was 
there any attem pt at reformulating Bangkok's urban ideology.98 Phibun, 
who was an admirer of Mussolini, certainly did not try to emulate his urban 
policy, which during the 1920s-30s brutally altered Rome's historic areas in 
order to recover archaeological remains useful to delineate the continuity 
between the Roman Empire and Fascist Italy. Nor, obviously, was Bangkok 
affected by the flourishing of official architecture and m onum ents to 
independence that reshaped the aspect of several Asian capitals at the end of 
the period of colonialist domination. The military-bureaucratic elite that 
has ruled Thailand since 1932 has showed a remarkable lack of concern -  
whether because of its cultural limits, disinterest, or satisfaction with the
the 75 cannons buried around the monuments symbolise the year 2475 of the Buddhist Era, i.e., 
1932 A.D.
97The monument was intended as a celebration of the short war fought in 1940 against France 
along the Indochinese border, and which yielded back to Thailand the former Siamese 
provinces of Siemraep and Battambang (cf. above, footnote 74).
98Keyes (1987:70) mentions the fact that Phibun fostered the plan for a new capital in the 
central part of northern Thailand, at Phetchabun. The plan caused a negative reaction, and 
when in 1944 the parliament voted against the Petchabun scheme, Phibun resigned from his 
Prime Ministership.
monarchy's heritage -  for conceiving a symbolic urban space balancing that 
of the royal city. On the other hand, Bangkok has had since the mid 1950s a 
m onstrous expansion, unplanned and ubiquitous and w ith a rapid  
population and geographical growth, resulting from its integration into the 
networks of multinational capital (Korff 1986:76).
In conclusion, from the perspective of its symbolic significance, 
Bangkok has remained the capital of the Chakri and, as such, the capital of 
Thailand. Its core, Ratanakosin, today officially nom inated a historic area, 
unquestionably m aintains its character as the heart of the city and of the 
whole nation, as is shown by its thick urban fabric which groups a majority 
of the most significant buildings and institutions of the country: the 
National Museum, Thammasat and Silpakorn Universities, Wat Mahathat, 
the offices of the FAD, the Ministries of Defense and of Foreign Affairs, Wat 
Pho, the city's foundation stone (Lak Muang) and, naturally, Wat Phra Keo 
and the Grand Palace. Here it is still possible to be spectator to offerings of 
likhai dancing to the spirit housed in the city-pillar's shrine, Brahmanic 
cerem onies of p loughing and cremation staged at Sanam Luang, and 
sprinkling of lustral water upon the thousand worshippers who attend the 
ritual of the seasonal changing of the robe of the Em erald Buddha 
performed by the King. And it is here that Bangkok's population, made up 
of people coming from all over the country, pays its tribute to the collective 
symbols, traditions and myths of the nation, testifying to its identification 
with, and sense of belonging to, the same community.
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5. Conclusion: Restoring Heritage, Edifying 
Myth
Culture (watanatham) and heritage (moradok) are words which have 
definitely acquired great currency in Thailand during the past fifteen years 
or so. Part of this popularity is certainly due to the resiliency of these two 
words, a resiliency which, in Thailand as everywhere else, turns out to be 
very useful for dignifying the most d isparate  features. Still, this 
developm ent in the language signals also a specific phenomenon in Thai 
society: the appearance of a generalised consciousness of national heritage, 
which is now inculcated even in the youngest students. Certainly, 
education about one's cultural patrimony is a principle which can hardly be 
questioned. However, the m agnitude of the national mobilisation around 
the theme of cultural heritage in Thailand suggested a critical scrutiny.
This study has looked at the particular case of Thai heritage through a 
wider critical lens which has magnified that aspect of every cultural heritage 
usually concealed by its enshrinement amongst the most valued assets of a 
country and ultimately, by virtue of the concept of "world heritage," of the 
whole of mankind. This concealed aspect is the political relevance of the 
cultural heritage of a nation, and its specific association with the foundation 
myth$ legitim ising every polity. The contents of political m yths are 
presented, just like those of the myths studied by anthropologists and 
classicists, as an indisputable tradition which asserts reliability and 
com m ands respect. Their characteristic form is that of the nationali&T 
narrative, a m ythology consisting of selected historical tales relating to a
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heroic past, which comes to be perceived by the national community as its 
collective past.
Despite these premises, a political m yth can be challenged and, 
eventually, replaced. The occasion for this is a crisis of legitimacy of the 
political order or, in Gramscian terms, a crisis of hegemony of the ruling 
bloc. The resolution of a legitim acy crisis achieved th rough  the 
establishm ent of a new political system necessarily brings about the 
replacem ent of the foundation myth of the obsolete polity with a m yth 
legitimising the new order. The solution of the crisis of legitimacy which 
occurred in Thailand in the early 1970s was not, however, a change in the 
political set-up, but the reimposition of the ancien regime. Such a political 
restoration required nonetheless a regeneration of the foundation m yth of 
the polity, a "face-lift" enabling that myth to be still significant after the 
rejection by a part of the Thai population of the symbols and the criteria of 
legitimation of the military-bureaucratic state-system.
Although violent repression and coercion -  which the Thai ruling 
elite has never hesitated to use ruthlessly to defend its own position -  can 
result in apparent order, even the generals who were once more in power 
from 1977 understood that, in order to achieve the more substantial political 
pacification required by the gravity of that crisis, a new consensus was 
necessary. And there is no stronger consensus than that premised upon a 
community of history and destiny which identifies people as members of 
the same polity and makes them participants in the myth of its foundation. 
Consequently, Thai state cultural policy implemented thereafter has fostered 
by every means the individual's identification with the nation, its glorious 
past and its promising future. Now, whilst no time-machine has yet been
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invented to materialise a peoples’ future in front of them, heritage does 
offer this possibility with regard to the past.
The salvaging of ruins which, with few exceptions, had been left for 
centuries at the mercy of the passing of time, has become in the second half 
of the 1970s the focus of government policy, international sponsorship, and 
national pride. The bureaucratisation of heritage, through the registration 
of ancient cities as national properties, has been the first step towards this 
aim. The implementation of effective restoration and conservation plans, 
which had previously proven to be problematic, has naturally been the 
essential pillar of the new heritage policy, as confirmed by the importance 
attached to the "historical parks" projects. In this regard, this essay has 
shown the extent to which, for better or for worse, the Fine Arts Department 
has influenced the final outcome. The selection of which heritage to 
recuperate and give centrality to at the national level has underpinned the 
whole operation. The restoration of national heritage has thus been 
perhaps the least immediately evident amongst the several forms taken by 
nationalist rhetoric in the late 1970s and 1980s to propagate the myth which 
formed the ideological basis for another fifteen years of conservative order, 
until the return of the Thai people to the front-stage of politics w ith the 
demonstrations of April-May 1992.
As an exercise in "de-mythification," I have tried to gloss the sub-text 
of the nationalist narrative told by means of those heritage sites which I 
have defined as topoi, m onum ents chosen to symbolise the stages of 
developm ent of the Thai nation-state according to the official historical 
perspective. It will probably be clear to the reader that this exercise has 
focused almost exclusively on the implications of the "visual transmission" 
of nationalist discourse through heritage, while neglecting the aspects, and
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the possible consequences, of the "reception" and decodification of its 
messages. However, the data and inferences presented allow us to conclude 
that, at least in quantitative terms, heritage is an im portant m edium  to 
shape knowledge and ideas about the past in contemporary Thai society.
Because of the institutionalisation of Thai national heritage as the 
response of the dom inant elite to the threat to its hegemony, the lack of a 
m onument or memorial gravestone to honour the m artyrs of October 1973 
and October 1976, and those so rapidly forgotten of May 1992, is not 
surprising. I had looked in vain for any possible evidence for such a 
m onum ent, or at least a project for it, when finally, in an issue of the 
Bangkok Post about the twentieth anniversary of the 1973 student uprising, 
I read a revealing story written by a reporter about a m onument which was 
never built (McDonhell 1993). After the uprising of October 1973, the 
National Student Council of Thailand, which had been the main promoter 
of the popular protest, collected four million Baht for the construction of a 
m onum ent com m em orating  the victim s of the riot. The Sanya 
government (1973-74) promised to pay half the cost, and a piece of land on 
the corner of Ratchadamnoen Avenue and Tanao Road, with the remains 
of a government building burned down during the demonstrations, was set 
aside for that aim. After the coup of October 6, 1976, eight million Baht were 
reportedly confiscated from the student organisations. In 1989, a temporary 
m onum ent was erected on the spot originally reserved to build the 
memorial and which is now occupied by lottery kiosks. The two-meter high 
monument, made of cement and portraying five youths intertwined around 
a flag, was realised by the artist as an unfinished piece of work to remind the 
people of the occultation of the money they donated to build a real
m onum ent.
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It is thus that the young Thais killed in their hom ecountry in the 
name of national security do not yet have a place bearing witness to their 
sacrifice, where the loss of their lives can be publicly honoured and admired 
as the highest example of true patriotism. Yet the absence of such a 
m onum ent is as eloquent as a presence. It clearly shows how much Thai 
civil society has still to endure in order to transform the painful memory of 
those events into the foundation myth of a new, more legitimate, political 
order, in which progressive thought and quest for change can be 
internalised as part of the collective civic patrimony. At seminars and 
conferences about the future directions in Thai politics, there are always 
some speakers asserting the irreversibility of the process of democratisation, 
and others warning about the threat of the resurgence of authoritarianism. 
Perhaps the day that the monument to the victims of repression is built will 
be the day the Gordian knot of Thai politics will have been undone forever.
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